23 3 *fhe soul a smple substance ,

substance made up of living parts, is not oneliving substance, but as many distinct livingsubstances, as there are distinct living partsin it. And indeed this composition and di-visibility of living substance must infer thesame consequences, as if we supposed mattera thinking living substance: the same mul-tiplicity, or rather infinite variety of consci-ousness and perception, must be as well inthe one cafe as the other. But this is notonly false, as plainly appears from the sim-plicity of our consciousness and perception,but cannot possibly be of any service to thosewho assert the soul’s mortality; for since everypart must be a living part into which eithersubstance, be it matter or spirit, is divisible,because a living whole could never be madeup out of any number of dead parts: Theymust necessarily of course by this supposed di-visibility, multiply living beings without end,or at last stop at indivisible living substances,which are liable to no essential alteration, andcan never cease to be by any other meansthan annihilation. And from hence it fol-lows , that parts and divisibility are not af-fections consistent with active perceptivesubstance, which must be one, and simple,

without