264 ‘Tho soul necessarily, living*

by the, aSiion of something external to it y other- 'wise it would not be percipient then; andthat the matter of the body, when rightlydisposed, doth this by acting upon it: it isanswered, that this is still to suppose it notpercipient in itself but rendered such by be-ing united to dead matter, which is the oldcontradiction still recurring. And this princi-ple (to take off an objection here by the by)shews that Lucretius'& great argument is anunphilofpphical mistake, when he fays sepa-rate spirits could nqt perceive without thehelp of the five senses (e). For to make the

ministry

(e) Praterea, si immortal!s natura anima'i 'J?,

Et fenfire poteji, fecr eta a corpore nojlro-,tfuinque (ut epinor) earn faciendum 'Ji fcnfibutautiam :

Nee ratione alia nosmet proponere nobisPojfumus infernas animus Acherunte vagare,

Pitlores itaque , tf feriptorum fascia prioraSic animas intraduxermt fens bus auilas.

At neque fearfum oculi , neque nares , nec manus iff 1Effe poteji anima ; neque feorfum lingua , nec aurcsAbfque anima per fe pojfunt fenfire ; nec effe.

Lib. 3 . ver. 624'

This argument in plain English is, I think, if d* efoul can perceive without body or matter , it must have 6 vematerial organs: a contradiction, which if he cannot fixupon his adversaries, must return on his method of rea-soning*