334 s ou l necessarily living,

a sleeping man thinks, without being con-scious of it; upon which he ailcs the question,Whether, during such thinking, it has anypleasure or pain, or be capable of happiness' or misery ? and adds, I am sure the mart i Snosy no more than the bed or earth he ls son (v). Because it is strange, if any ma#put him to the trouble of confuting this con-tradiction, with the supposition of Caft^and PolluXy Socrates and Plato. The posi-tion his adversaries maintain infers no fu^contradiction; nor justifies another to &&it for them. There is certainly a great ck aof our past consciousness, which we retai°no memory of afterward. It is a particula smark of our finite and imperfect natures,that we cannot become conscious of allpast consciousness at pleasure. But no m^nat night would infer, that he was not in astate of consciousness and thinking, at sn°^a certain minute about twelve a-clock ofday, because now perhaps he hath no mem 0 'ry what particular thought he had atminute. And it is no better argument, condered in itself, that a man was not consci oU *at such a minute, in his steep, because n e

(v) Ibid. sect. ix.

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