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case) without supposing that it is laid up tohe refitted, in sleep, as the body is; or mak-ing sleep an affection of immaterial being ?If a man puts in a bit of paper to hinder thebalance of his watch from beating, or ifthis is effected by any other disorder of theparts; it would be improper to fay that theimmaterial impulse, or power, by whichshe goes, is then asleep, though it be hin-dered from having effect.

XXV. There is one argument broughtby Mr. Locke , which is boasted to be deci-fivc, as fully proving that thinking is notinseparable from the soul. It is that actionmay be remitted or intended , sometimes moreand sometimes less; a variation which it isnot conceivable the essences of things can besubject to {z). This is indeed specious at firstVle W, and yet it is a very equivocal argumenta nd concludes different ways, according to thedifferent acceptation of the word ejsence . He§ r ants that thinking is action, and supposese de nee to be the internal, unknown constitu-tlQ n of things, whereon their discoverableQualities depend. Now that thinking or ac-

(z) B. 1. ch. 19. sect. 4.

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