344 The soul necessarily livings

never think again of itself, but be a dead in-*active substance for ever after such intermis-sion, unless thus restored by some external bet-ing, And the argument must come to thison Mr. Locke's■ hypothesis, if the soul werefor any the least time without thought. Thepower of thinking in a substance once dead,is not to be conceived, because it is contra-dictory. Life itself consists in being percipi-ent, in this we are necessary. And if we arepercipient, we must have perceptions, bythe terms. Thus it is very conceivable thatthe soul should remit its activity in thinking,through all degrees, till at length it can re*mit no farther, and finds itself necessary i°having some perception or other. Experienceconfirms this, as far as we can have expe-rience j and reason evinces it universally: notcan any objection be made to it but onlythis, that we do not remember all our pa&perceptions, the weakness of which hath beensufficiently shewn before.

XXVI. Mr. Locke , in his way of arguing,takes it for granted, that if a property dothnot enter into the internal unknown conffi"rution of a substance, it is separable s rorrl