'when separatedfrom the body. 34.9

second section; simple, and therefore indis-soluble, without an act of Omnipotence, by

the

can it be said then that the body by acting on it makes» percipients or brings back its perception to it again;tvhen it is plain that it is percipient already, but that thenerves or spirits are in no capacity to act upon it ? Thisinstance likewise shews us, that the soul would be perci-pient of any external touch upon the body while we sleep,of which it is percipient while we are awake; if the ac-tion were communicated to it; and consequently it disco-vers to us, byway of experiment, on which fide the indis-position lies, and that sleep is not an affectionsf the wholehlan, foul as well as body , as Mr. Locke insinuates.

In a word, there is no supposing the soul to be imper-c 'pient in sleep, but by supposing the perceptivity of itto depend upon matter, which I have shewn in manyplaces of this section to be a contradiction: or by sup -Posing that it sleeps in its own nature. And we cannotOppose that it sleeps in its own nature, but by supposingthat it is a compounded thing, made up of parts of dif-ktent natures, some of which fly off, or wear out, likethose of the body; that is, by supposing, I think, that*t Consists of matter and spirit. But this is not onlysulfe, as has been shewn in the last section; but I would: ' , 'gue concerning the a Olive half of such a compoundedh u l, as I have done already, when I supposed it uncorri-Pounded. The pure immaterial part would never needfl eep or reparation. And thus I would pursue the argu-ment through all divisions, till it were owned that eitherthe soul was all matter , or that a pure uncompounded fpi~rtt needed no sleep nor reparation. Now from all that

hath