364 ObjeSlions to the immateriality

tic would still maintain, if possible, under j Q ,

some disguise or other. If this could be • all

that to

could be advanced by him, but what was highly reason- ^i

able, and evident in itself; yet no man has a greater wr

share of this credulity, nor fays such shocking things. A ty

lit of wood, for instance , may become a living Being: & f U]

particle of matter if placed on this fide produces nothing i jui

but if placed on the other fide , it has life and motion: so]

knowledge and reason are only the result of a different ot" so]

der or situation of these dead atoms. If his Adversaria th

spoke thus, they would justly deserve that ridicule re

contempt with which he treats them. The reason whyLucretius advanced all this, was (as he says) to free m efl rl

from superstition and error; and the like things are still to

maintained under the fame pretence; but it would b £ lie

better, if the Sceptic (according to the character he C(

first sets out with) would broach no hypothesis of h lS p;

own; if he would content himself with pointing out t0 k

other men wherein they are wrong, and strewing f r

weak sides of the arguments they adduce. Truth wo 11 ^ st

thus be no loser; men would either reconcile difficult^' t<

or relinquisli the principles whose consequences were e vl ' I

dently absurd. But when it appears he hath other vse^' £

an itch to maintain something of his own; his pretenc eS ’ t(

though specious, become suspected. And yet it was ah c

ways thus; we never had a disinterested Examiner of 0 ' j,

ther men’s notions. The Academick himself will not k ££ P c

within his own province; he has a favourite fchcM £ » t

contrary to the neutrality he promises to observe. Wh est {

a Sceptic turns dogmatist in savour of his own hypothesis, ,

nothing can be more out of character: and yet I am ap £

to