z88 ObjeSHons to the immateriality

may; or if other impressions are made, con-trary to the order of external nature , as indreams: that the foul ssiould be percipient ofimpressions, which for the time are not, ornot percipient of those which are, is impos-sible ; which therefore can be no imputationon its rational nature; for thus far it is bare-ly passive. If new impressions are made, orthe former impressions darkened, or not pa-tent ; it is only the perceptivity of the soiil(in which we are necejjary and pajjive at alltimes) which is misinformed from without ,and not its rational power or activity, whichis perverted within. Let it be considered,that even the sensory, or that part of thebrain to which the soul is united, is externalto the soul, i. e. doth not belong to it as spart of itself: and therefore it may have mis-representations made to it, by means of this*and yet not be touched ot affected in its ownnature. I do not fee, according to this ob-jection, why it ssiould not be made an impu-tation on the rational nature of the soul, thatit is at all joined to a material organ. Andthen the objection is levelled at somethinghigher than the soul itself. What imperfectioncan it be in a percipient Being, that it lS

percipient