of the soul considered . 393

nor for a bad end ; nor is it the effe ft of chance.If in steep all had been an universal blank ofconsciousness and action, it would have beenvery difficult to have persuaded most men,by reason alone, that the soul retained thesepowers in that state: but as things at presentare, we see that the soul doth not owe itsperception to the body, that it is percipientwhen that can communicate no action to it,and that sleep is not an affection of the wholeman. (See the note (2) N° 26. of the lastsection). These particulars farther plead anexcuse for endeavouring to find out somelight, some consistent meaning in this per-plexed subject. (See N° 23. of the last.)

XII. From all that is said it appears, thatit is no reproach upon the rational foul to fay,That the perfection of rational thinking de-pends on the matter of the body, as an im-peding or obftrufting cause: But that the per-fection of rational thinking should dependUpon the matter of the body, as a promotingor effefting cause (which is indeed the trueMeaning intended in the objection) is a directcontradiction. There is certainly a depen-dence but it is such as I have described it to

be