of the soul considered. 397

percipient being (y) suppose it so absolutelynecessary to perceiving; that at length weseem to fancy that the perceptive capacitylyes in it alone; or at least, that it is thefirst and chief thing that perceives. So muchdoth the found of the word [ sensory ] makeus forget the nature of the thing ! Nor dowe stop here; but having once allowed it tobe the percipient , we at length suppose itto be the agent also; though it is very certainfrom sect. 1. and 2. that this same sensory is,after all, nothing but dead and senfeles mat-ter. Why should a sensory be at all necessaryto the soul in a state of union ? This is cer-tainly worth considering. Only for this rea-son, because in a state of confinement to adark and close cell, the action of externalobjects was to be conveyed to the foul, bysome material part or other, if it were at allto be percipient of them. And it is thuskept at a distance from the objects them-selves, and receives information about themby the mediation of another things and withdisadvantage (x). Hence the soul is at a great

deal

(v) See the Note (») N<-15. of the last Section.

(*) I must observe here, with respect to what is said

concerninS

5