426 ObjeSlims Q the immateriality

sophical term, vis inertia ; .and. th^jnconfi-fience of inactivity and active power is a self-evident truth. Proceeding then fairly andingenuously with these principles,' what ascene of things do we not discover, performedby immaterial power, both in the animal bo-dy and without it! Farther, if inactivity be-longs to matter; power and perceptivity mnftcertainly belong to another subs anc e. This isno less self-evident. And then to collect whatfarther is necessary to be known about activeperceptive Being (as above) whether in a stateof union or separation, cannot be extremelydifficult. This, I conceive, is the propermethod. .It is true Lucretius brings store ofother arguments for the immateriality of thefoul; but they are such as need not be men-tioned. He generally touches on somethingthat falls in with a common prejudice, or isapt to raise a scruple at first view; but hav-ing done that, he is forced to leave it; forthat is all that can bp done. The subjectwill not abide an argument, or bear beingexamined on all sides (n.)

XXL V/e

(«) Of this kind is the objection, that material andimmaterial (or, as he willfully mis-names them* mortal

and