[i

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» * d

242 Dean Berkeley’ j scheme

originally, eternally consistent ideas; f° r ^eternal consistency and agreement of th e ^ideas, makes these eternal properties.from hence again it follows, that we cast >monstrate several eternal truths concertthe natures or ejfences of things: for to n 1 ^the necessity, or necessary consistence,these eternal properties, is todemonstra teternal truths concerning their natures. T°emplify this. Solidity and extension were etnally consistent in the divine ideas, so aS , /be made to subsist in the same subject* ^ .which subject indeed we have no idea; ^God hath, and had it before the subject ‘ ltwas:) this eternal consistency makes theture of this thing eternal. There was & lPa necessary connexion between the id e ^ #solidity and resist anc e ; if it did not reh .would be unsolid: or the idea of not-ftffis inconsistent with the idea of solidity •over there was an inconsistency between j.idea of reststing and the idea of off'edli^S^ Ait resisted, [viz. a change of its present 1 ^And therefore from this respect, orof these ideas to each other, this p r °P e ^That it is impossible this thingeftect a change of its present state, etef ^