and

andJhewn inconclusive. 243

ff necejfarily belongs to the nature of itu therefore, when we shew the necessity1 this

>h

property, we demonstrate an eternalconcerning the nature of this thing.before, as before, I infer that we can de-^strate several eternal truths concerningnatures or essences of things (c.)

On the other hand, the exftence oft er ^ bath no eternal properties ; that is, e-consistent, or necessarily related ideas,|^, 0n ging to it. These were all in the Divine^ 0n § before any thing but himself ac-1 v existed; and belong to their natures ,^ '■beir affinal exiftence, which was ar-s u ^ r y and depended upon his good plea-ts to affect. The property just now men-iu ec b v. g. is no way predicable concern-existence of matter, nor true only** exists; but concerning its nature,lor e trUe whether it exists, or not. There-,'here is no eternal truth demonstrable, Cer siing the existence of Beings, (the ne~

(') 'p.

Vift ne natu res of things with respect to us, are theEllt *deas in our minds, which are copies (though

“Ut

• P er fcct, and in part ) of the eternally consistent i-

" “* Divine Mind/

R 2

cefsarily