andshewn inconclusive. 259

8$“*, is not far from owning this. In‘ 1 3 8. of what he calls his Principles , he

«c. these words:-“ If therefore ’tis

< t ^Possible that any degree of these powers< t telling, thinking, and perception of ideas,< t to Wit] should be represented in an idea cr< t ^tion, 'tis evident there can be no idea orys otlQ n of a spirit .”—Here we may observeofp^we neither have any idea or noticnP ll 'itual substance itself, nor of these prc-k :t,es whereby we could only come to thehr e< % e of such a substance, (aidivity andthe examples of which he as-- ' tt seems impossible that such a thing

of ev er have entered into the thoughtsThese particulars ought to be wellt^j s r , re d by those who run so greedily into

ctle me. It is true, thinking, willing , &c.^ be painted in the imagination, asb* t \ having figure and magnitude may :\ ^Sht not this Author thus prove, thathiftss have no idea or notion of virtue,faj r ' l rut h? And if this consequence beMi Ca tj 11 seems to be; this scheme is a com-■hve l0fl °s t i >e Jp ec ' ies °f Scepticijm that*>0t q V , Cr yet been broached. Notion extendsy to the images of corporeal objects

S 2

in