260 Dean Berkeley 'sscheme eocatnt^ 1

in the ,

of the understanding (k). It is not enosgjjthat an Author is not explicit in owning a .the absurdities which arise from his fche & c 'or that he denies them : others will a$§°

fancy, but to whatever is the obje#

(<(•) Des Cartes and Mr. Locke, take the word.self in the same sense. Mr. Locke fays, .

self. 8.) " It being that Term, which, I think, ,“ best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the 1111“ standing, when a man thinks, I have used it t0 .

“ press whatever is meant by Phantasm, Notion, “r J“ or whatever it is, which the mind can be emp'y j" about in thinking.” Des Cartes fays in his geon ietrmethod of proving the existence of God, and the ^Defin. 2. Here nomine intelligo cujujlibet cogitation^mam ilium , per cujus immediatam perceptionem ips tUi ^^dem cogitationis conscius sum ; adeo ut nibil possttn ^ ^exprimere intelligendo id quod dico, qmn ex hoe tyft ^turn sit in me ess ideam ejus quod verlis illisAt que ita non solas imagines in phantasm dep'A ai * rJvoco: imo ipsas hie nulto modo voco ideas, quatenfsin phantasm torporea, hoc ejl in par te all qua cerebra f ^fee, fed tantum quatenm mensem ipjam in illotn jpartem eonversam informant . This is very distil ^full. Dean Berkeley, who will not allow us to ba v ' e uSnotion or idea of thinking, willing, (Ac. should g jj- Shis acceptation of the word; or shew us what 1S ^in Mr. Locke or Des Cartes’s acceptation. Whatemay fay about abjlrati ideas, it is certain all true d cl °stration is in abstract ideas.