2 7 2 Bean Berk el ey V scheme exatnind

it is otherwise unintelligible. Whence i £clearly follows j Matter which is not percefr

from the meaning of the term exist, when applied to^sible things. Thus, the table I write on exists: u e '

fee and feel it.-But the existence of unthink' 11 ^

Beings, without any relation to their being perceived- 1unintelligible: their esse is percipi.

One cannot well pals by the argument here, wit* 10enquiring a little into the reasonableness of it. This p f0 ^.position [their ejse is percipi'] is delivered with the ftan axiom ; but if it be, it is incumbent on the Auth> f ithink (who seems to be the first that discovered itj ^shew the necessary connexion between the terms eft ^percipi, in it. It cannot be said to be Jels-evidenU ° awhich account certain propositions were first called ^oms; since others cannot find out the self-evidencheven the truth of it. We fay indeed with respect t0 t ’ 1Deity, his ejse is exijtere, because necessary existence b elongs to his nature ; but no body allows that to heftccivcd belongs to the ejse or nature of matter; s°this axiom appears to me, after the exactest enquiry 1 ^able to make, to be such an axiom as begs the quest 10 *'

He argues from the meaning of the word [exift J £0 ^

when spoken of material things, it is the fame a 510 ^

perceived ; but who besides the Author himself, had 1

fixed this meaning to that term ? Is it the comnu 111 aC ?

ceptation of the word, when applied to material thii^S®

Hath he the Philosophers, or even the vulgar on his 1 ^

in this, as he seems to insinuate elsewhere? Pyth°ft ,

asserted