and Jhewn biconclujtve. 281

option, with respect to the minute-hand (s).

XVIII. Again,

. (0 We may draw it as a corollary from the argument11 *his paragraph, That our perceptions in general have^ Parts, or are indivisible; and particularly that our i-or perceptions of divisible, extended substance, are^selves indivisible , without parts or extension. If they^ ere not, then the million-millionth part of the percep-tl ° n of an inch long, would be some part of it, or per-^ Ve d by the terms.. And from-this again it will follow,the percipient Being in us is not matter ■, because if' lr Perceptions of length, breadth, figure, were in aj? a terial substance, they Jhould necessarily have dimen-

«

'Otis,

t'ns.

For such ideas of figures would'be then affecti -1

or modifications of matter; but all affections ofModifications of matter, must be inherent in the mat-Whose modifications they are. And if the percep-'or idea of a figure, be an inherent modiscation , orAction of matter ; it is clear it mus inhere in all the>nr ‘tter percipient of it, and therefore have equal super-nal dimensions at least. And, secondly, our percep-^ons of extension being without parts illustrates and con-what was said in Sect. 3. viz. That the foul hathParts, or is a simple, indivisible fubs'ahce. We mustI think, tha tall the soul is percipient: if any part■ ^ ^ Were impercipient that would not have the na-^ Ute of s ou i (or of percipient Being.) And if all the foul, 6 Incipient, and yet its perceptions be without parts,tnust f a y that it hath no parts. If the foul were ex-Mp'ded as matter is, certainly our perceptions would ba' . . extended,