282 Dean Berkeley V scheme exami^ 6 ^

XVIII. Again ,solidity,figure^ dtoifibtlitf'&c. are either properties inhering in

extended, or have parts ; infinite divisibility ofwould not only be conceived by abstract reason,the actual infinite little parts would be piSiuredif I may so express it; or they would be as mud t 1 *ceived, , as any parts, and that by the terms being r ^of the perception. And lastly, from this corollary ^the following question; If the faculty of imagination ^quires a picture extended in length and breadths but ,idea or perception, as it is in the mind , is extent ’Does not the power of imagination as much infer a ^terial sensory or organ, as a pure or simpleon requires an unextended or immaterial percipient-imagination, or in sensation of visible objects, the Pception is not itself a picture ; but undoubtedly it iS .perception of a picture somewhere lodged. And if ^be so; imagination, as it is the perception of a pict^’shews not only that the foul is immaterial, but tb$is united to a material sensory , where the picture > s ^ ^pressed, and to which it applies for the percept* 011 0it; or that matter exists. How far this argum eIlt ^applicable to overturn D. B.’s scheme the IntelbA^will determine; but Cartes himself, who, it n*a/presumed, strewed D. B. the way of calling nia terl ,substance in question, says— Nam attentius confide aquidnam fit imagination nihil a Hud effe apparet quantdam applicatio facultatis cognofcitivæ ad corpus ipfi ,npress ens [the sensory] ac proinde exist ens. Meditat- 6*

substance