andshewn inconclusive . 299

V. Thus much of the different statemind itself in these two conditions, of

sleep-

and not dreaming, and the former argument will1 he applicable.

^ ®ut allowing the Scepticism to be pushed as far as mayI' h one should fay, " I never dreamed in my life.”lnce some of these men affirm this of themselves ) whatea f°n would he have for asking a whereby to

^ ln guifh dreaming from not dreaming , when he owns,E ne ver dreamt in all his life ? And if he should fay,I( I had such a dream last night, and was verily per-, h^ded of the real exijlence of the things seen; andw hy may not the things I fee and hear now be asfantastical as these were?” I answer, first, he is in-^ a Pable of being satisfied; because on his own principles,e 'Vill still have equal reason to think any answer as phan-^ tleal as the person [or rather cpiA/t&rua, according towho gives him the answer: and therefore, as I said^beginning of the Section, he should forever hold'.. *°ngue, and doubt on in silence. When he desires fa-to a< ^’ on > he supposes the reality of the thing he pretendsj- ^ 0tt bt os. This is always the fate of Scepticism. And,when he fays, “He dreamed last night, &c.”J owns he is awakened out of that dream now, other-? l* e fe could not perceive that it was but a dream: Or^ , e must allow he is still dreaming on; and, as I said,

v a fev er answer is made to him must still appear a dream,should fay," I am not certain whether I ever dream-

" ed