3 o o Dean Berkeley V scheme exami? 1 ^

steeping and waking, which brings thel^w sought to self-consciousness. But

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“ edin my life, ornot.” It is as if he should fay,

" not certain, that ever I was in a different state o ^“ sciousnefs from what I am in at present.” .

why should he demand a xgflwtov or mark to know vV '

of the two states he is in, who never observed aslfference i He can have no doubt of the reality ot ^nal objects, who was never imposed on, by being ^^to think ^Æ»f<7/?stn/objects real. And how could 11 ^answer give satisfaction to such a man ? Is he tb'aA 5things real, he will need no satisfaction; and if hethem phantajlical, the answer must appear to be ^much as all other things. In a word, he hath either Pceived a difference, of the state of consciousness he ^been in; or he hath not : if he hath not, he can h» ve ^doubt; and if he hath observed a difference, he ^ O 0 fconsider that difference, and is obliged to answer hi* 11as having a conscious experience of the thing he def*r £S ^be informed of. For it is mrrr humour , and in effe'st ^surdity, for a man to fay, r ' r

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tarry, tor a man to fay, “ Inform me of a P artl °^ 6 fsof which I have experience in my own confc*° ufrom your experience of it in yours sinee/r? ^sciousnefs of what pafies in one’s own mind, is { b eappeal in all controversy.

From all this, it appears still more plain, I think, ^Scepticism, in any shape that may be given it, 15 JJ1sistentwith itself, in supposing the thing concerning wit pretends to doubt; and therefore it defeats its ^