and Jhevm inconclusive . 313

^ rat <oti is m ideas, to say it is conversant about no objetf0 , ^ eas i as if would be to fay, because all demonstrati-j t be pronounced in wards, or written on paper,irj Cari re ^ ate t0 nothing but the words it is pronouncedtth° r l ^ e P a P er it is written upon. Omitting thereforej. Cr 'nuances, I (hall give one, which seems to prove^ e % the existence of objects without the mind, and3 j ^ r °m the perceptions of the mind itself.

0y r ideas have no parts, and yet if we perceive^ * it is plain we perceive something more than ourr. Perceptions. But both these are certain; we are am-^ ^ mat we perceive parts, when we look upon a house,j a river, the dial-plate of a clock or watch. This^ fliort an( j ea fy wa y 0 f being certain that somethingS without the mind. We are certain of this from

^l c ‘ ou sness itself-, fince we are as conscious that we per-9r E Parts, as that we have perceptions at all. And this^SUrrt Cn t proves at once, and from the same perceptions,

^ ex 'stence of both the parts of our composition; (fee6 ^ote (j) N“ 27. above) and therefore makes thein e ” Ce both equally certain. Our ideas as they aref0 e mind, are without parts; and as they make ustcn t j ?5,<S Perceiving parts, we are conscious that an ex-t e ^ object exists without the mind, where the ex-^ E< i image is exhibited, viz. an extended sensory. Our^ f'' n sations, and the faculty of imagination, as muchift existence of this sensory, as they prove the ex-a ^ Ce °f the sensitive Being; and this whether it be inPro fever, or any way a Sceptic pleases to suppose,^ only parts be perceived. The wildest chimeras

ee P prove the certainty of the thing they were brought

to