314 Dean Berkeley ’ j schemeexami^ 1

to render suspected. If these sensories were trot)would be no such illusions: and if some other cause ^ ^matter, did not make these impressions, there W° ustill no such illusions. Our steeping sensations iS>the existence of one cause more , than our waking ^lions shew us.

I am persuaded, if Des Cartes had observed th' 5 *perty of our ideas as they are in the mind, viz. ^are without parts or extension, (and the definit 101 ^gives of an idea which I have quoted above, l £ac ^ „directly to it) he would have owned that theceptian of parts proved to us the existence of both ^stances. He does indeed in some places point I ^this truth.. Pr esterea (fays he) ex imaginandis acU rqua me uti experior, dum circa res materiales vers 1 ’ 'qui videtur illas exijicre. He saw here thereother way of accounting for the faculty of iniag t>!il (0but by the existence of a material sensory. It v>re! je5be wiflied, he had gone a little farther. But hestill nearer below. —Æ hœc consdero istam vint h fl e ^nandi ques in me eft, front differs a vi intellig ell< ^’ ^met ipsus, hoc eft^ ad mentis meæ essentiam, ? lon . „ri ; nam, &c. Meditat. 6. How near is this to P r ■ ^the existence of both substances from the fame pt rc "of parts or extended images ! 0 [j-

One who considers this argument, can make n° ^jection to it from the images formed by spc cU ^ a ' c hthese are extended , and prove what I advance, asas any appearance. In this instance, magnifi l!1 S £image , i. e. enlarging the extension of it , * s ^end proposed, and every one knows that such IJ