336 flatter not eternal ctnduncaus^'

have existed) if he supposes matter attime not to have existed, this contradict 1011comes full home to him. [It would h aV °been absurd in Lucretius , who said, Not®existed but matter , to have said, Once ^itself might not have existed. ] Or if he fh°°.say there are two necejjary Beings, of vct 1matter is one, and that some time or ot ^it might not have existed, he not only a ^surdly makes the half of necesiary Beingtingent; but since they are equally nece*if one might have not existed, the other 3might have not existed; and thus still not* ^at all might have once existed: and healways be reduced to this, though he lh oll , £suppose a hundred such Beings (d.) ^ ^

(d) The argument shewing that matter doth st° ^necessarily is of great consequence; since it folios j .it, that an immaterial Being must have existed nece /L #1*for it would be absurd to say either that nothing e * l J ^cejfarily , or that what exists necessarily is neither ^

nor not matter. Therefore I shall here remark 3 ^

difficulty or two started against the reasoningtwo paragraphs. Because I have said, if mattereternally and without a cause, it is contradictorypose it not to have existed in all time past, ° r 11ist in all tinue to come: It hath been observed ^