latter mt eternal dnduncaused. 337

remembered that uncaused, self - exist ent tnece Jsarily existing , and independents are all

equivalent

, t 0llle may look on it in the natures of the things them -fches, as far as known to us, equally possible for them< t have begun to be , or never begun to be [as having<< a bvays existed to wit] ; or even after they have beend° r ever, or for any time, to be annihilated by some^ Ccitt se endued with the requisite powers.” But let itth ^Edered how absurd it would be to affirm either ofj Contraries, matter began to be, or had a cause; mat -ne% >er began to be, or had no cause, equally possible ;t ^ le one must be unalterably true, and the otherp s * and if we know any thing, we must know thatkif • i^ cannot he equally competent to two such pro-jj ltl °ns more than to a proposition of Euclid, and theof it. If matter be a self-existent thing, it was^ Possible for that very reason that ever it could haveto he ; and vice versa, if matter began to be, it"^Possible it could have been felf-existeht. Though(ty^ ter may be indifferent to existence or non-existence,** there is no necessity on either side); yet itb Qr ttever be indifferent to necessary existence or arbi.5ft ^ e>t }fi e nce ; that would be to make necessity itself con-s U(;li difference. Whence it appears, that to entertaino n a n °tion of matter, as is mentioned in the objecti-he extremely absurd; and if it be a commontft er linking, it ought to be rectified. And far-t *^ c / Vhich ^°ever of these two propositions, MatterY ^ a cause , Matter existed by no cause, be the true

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