Matter not eternal and uncaused. 359

banner of its existence changed by an activec ause. If indeed it were possible that a passivesubstance should not be the effect of an activecause, but uneffected, uncaused; then there'Vould be no need of any cause at all to producean y effect; for effects, or things of a passiveNature, might be felf-existent, which wouldConfound reason, and put an end to philo-sophy.

> X. Against this argument from the passi-vity of matter the following difficulty hathkeen moved. “ There seems to be this ma-terial difference betwixt a thing’s being‘ passive in relation to another Being, and a' thing’s being an effect of a cause, that thefirst as a relation might never exist, tho’the things exist; the other must exist when-t over the subjects exist. A thing may be of{ a passive nature, and yet never acted upon.t This relation, if the cause of it is asked,f fi°ws from the nature and essence of things.( May not one argue from a thing’s existing^ of an active nature, that the passive BeingC{ Uaust necessarily exist in the same manneras yo u d 0 j n this place ?” To this I answerthat it is not to be understood how a re-A a 4 lation