36c Matter not eternal and uncaufi^

lation should not exist, if the related thing 3themselves exist; nor how a thing of a pa 1 'five nature should exist without ever havingbeen acted upon. If father and son exist,relation between them must exist: nay, if ^son alone exists, being a related thing, ^ ,lSas much infers that the father existed ingeneration, as if both the terms were expr e '"ed; since a relation cannot consist in DllSterm. In like manner, a thing of a past' 5 ' ,enature is a relative term, and infers a thinAdifferent from itself to be the other term 0the relation. If a relation stows from ^nature of things, it flows from the natur £ 0both the related things. It cannot flow st 01 * 1the nature of one thing only. Relations a feas eternal between the ideas in the pi vl ° eMind as any thing else; but even there a r£ ^lation- doth not consist in one idea.these ideas are the origin of the nature an^essence of things. This expression, “ath !n »tc may be of a pajjive nature and yet" aSied uponf passes over th cmain point, anshuffles in another instead of it. It supP 0 La thing of a passive nature once exijh n £> ,matter how, but without having been acupon in the production; and then inflst s