Matter not eternal and uncaused. 389

physical or moral necessity be alledged why itshould be so; and an eternal effect, thoughn °w become a philosophical term, will never-tfieless be an eternal contradiction (r.)

XIX. Having

tbwg . Ttat would be making war upon all the principles°f action and reason itself.

( r ) Mr. Leibnitz has contended that God could not

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fl ave created the material world less than insnite , not^ a ving a sufficient reason to determine in what part of infi-^te Space a finite mass of matter was to be placed. Butu Pon the same account it might be contended, that he^°uld not have made it other than eternal, not having aEfficient reason to determine in what period of eternity,OH may so speak) it was to commence, And then we^ ave an eternal as well as infinite creation , from the forcethis principle; which is a contradiction in terms, if byCsea tion be meant a thing’s getting existence which had it1101 before; and if it always had existence it couM not bere ated. Examples of this fort are numberless : Of two^ llar , equal and solid particles of matter, and Dr. Clarkethere must be numberless such particles, unless we0 j. % that matter is all pores without any solidity in it:^ an y two of these, I say, God could not have placedst 6 ° ste * n an t P°s tttDni > or in any particular body, ratherjct'tthe other, not having a reason to determine the pre-the^ 6 " ^ a > n J since all might have been adjusted afteraille manner as at present, if the heavenly bodies hadto V ri ^ r ° m ea si to west, instead of moving from west' si follows, that God could not have made themVe cither way, not having a sufficient reason to deter-C c 3 mine