390 Matter not eternal anduncaujd-

XIX. Having shewn that matter is not ex-ternal in any sense , one is naturally led to °

serve,

mine which of the ways. Thus, according to this P^_ciple, God could not have made the world at all, ^the least thing in it; for such reasons will hinder ething; and this moral necessity ex tended beyond its hoUl 1 ^,into barely physical circumjlances , ties down the po'W® 1 'the Deity' more rigidly than fatal necessity itself. W jtasked, Doth ever God aft then, without a sufficient fe _for the action, and a wise view ? I answer, he doth ^ ^but the sufficient reason os action is taken from theof the whole effect, the use and design of it; notphysical circumstances in themselves indifferent*bad the mofl sufficient reason, and the wisest designs t0swer in creating the world, which are not, cannot 0 .

strated, by there being one atom more or less ofit, by its being created a minute sooner or later, by 1 .

isting in the present portion of space rather than an °^j ie jiand we grosly misplace the sufficiency of the reason, ^

we lodge it in the indifference of physical thmffin truth, it is no better than to make a slave of th® ^ er eto deny his power to accomplish an end, becau ^are more ways than one by which it might bewell effected. If it should be said, “We are n°t t0 ^“ pose such indifference even vnphysical circurnjl ariCe \

“ therefore that God could have made the leas, vein these, without a sufficient reason to determineI answer, Mr. Leibnitz himself supposes such in ^

when hs asserts that there was no reason why ^ j, 0 t