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when it may be depended upon that the armyis defiling across, and during which operation,confusion will be most likely to ensue. If thenight be let pass, all the army of the enemywill, most probably, have crossed by the mor-row ; and to attack then, will not be an affairof detail, but a general action, which reasons ofstate do not always permit a general to hazard.

Napoleon’s first attempt to cross the Danube ,and to establish himself beyond it, was accom-panied with the severe loss, and deserved thefailure, which enterprises of pure, open force,upon one point, generally meet; but from theerrors committed on the other side, his repulsecost the Austrians equally dear, and preventedthem from taking advantage of the very criticalposition of the French army after it’s defeat.The success of the great enterprise was mainlyowing to the extraordinary inactivity of the

of some row-boats, 300 men were thrown over in the night,and established themselves on the further side. At day-lightthey were attacked by considerable numbers, and all the artil-lery of the enemy was brought against them; but 100 pieces ofcannon, placed in battery on the left bank, forced the enemy towithdraw. The next night between 2 and 3,000 men were sentover, who immediately began to throw up a tete-de-pont capa-ble of containing two divisions; at day light the work wasfinished, in the rough, when the enemy retired .—Note of thelrtnch Translator.