584

TWENTY-SECOND CONGRESS. Sess. I. Ch. 227. 1832.

shall be charged in conformity with such appraisal; on wool, unmanu-factured, the value whereof, at the place of exportation, shall exceedeight cents, shall be levied four cents per pound, and forty per centumad valorem: Provided, That wool imported on the skin shall be estimated,as to weight and value, as other wool.

Second. On all milled and fulled cloth, known by the name of plains,kerseys, or kendal cottons, of which wool shall be the only material, thevalue whereof shall not exceed thirty-five cents a square yard, five percentum ad valorem; on worsted stuff goods, shawls and other manufac-tures of silk and worsted, ten per centum ad valorem; on worsted yarn,twenty per centum ad valorem; on woollen yarn, four cents per pound,and fifty per centum ad valorem; on mits, gloves, bindings, blankets,hosiery, and carpets and carpeting, twenty-five per centum, except Brus-sels, Wilton, and treble ingrained carpeting, which shall be at sixty-threecents the square yard; all other ingrained and Venetian carpeting, atthirty-five cents the square yard; and except blankets, the value whereofat the place from whence exported, shall not exceed seventy-five centseach, the duty to be levied upon which, shall be five per centum advalorem; on flannels, bookings, and baizes, sixteen cents the square yard;on coach laces, thirty-five per centum; and upon merino shawls made ofwool, all other manufactures of wool, or of which wool is a componentpart, and on ready-made clothing, fifty per centum ad valorem, (a)

(a) Under the act of Congress passed July 14, 1832, ch. 227,entitled (< An act to alter and amendthe several acts imposing duties on imports,” v/orsted shawls with cotton borders, and worsted suspen-ders with cotton straps or ends, are not subjected to a duty of fifty per cent, ad valorem. Elliott v.Swartwout, 10 Peters, 137.

Laws imposing duties on goods are intended for practical use and application by men engaged incommerce, and hence it has become a settled rule in the interpretation of statutes of this description toconstrue the language adopted by the legislature, and particularly in the denomination of articles, ac-cording to the commercial understanding of the terms used. Ibid.

Construction of statutes:

The principles applied in the courts of the United States , in relation to the construction of statutesof the United States , and of statutes in general.

The suspension of a statute for a limited time, is not a repeal of it. Brown, plaintiff in error, v. Barry,3 Dali. 365; 1 Cond. Hep. 165.

The intention of the legislature, when discovered, must prevail; any rule of construction, declaredby previous acts, to the contrary notwithstanding. Ibid.

The presumption must always be in favour of the validity of a law if the contrary is not clearly demon-strated. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dali. 14; 1 Cond. Rep. 211.

A legislative act founded on a mistaken opinion of what was law, does not change the actual stateof the law, as to pre-existing cases. Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1 ; 1 Cond. Rep. 229.

It is true, that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hardagainst a construction, which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties; but ingreat national concerns, where individual rights acquired by war are sacrificed for national purposes,the contract making the sacrifice ought always to receive a construction conforming to its manifestimport; and if the nation has given up the vested rights of its citizens, it is not for the court, but forthe government, to consider whether it be a case proper for compensation. United States v. The SchoonerPeggy. 1 Cranch, 103; 1 Cond. Rep. 256.

If courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of thelegislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137 ; 1 Cond. Rep. 267.

In the construction of a statute, positive and explicit provisions, comprehending in terms a wholeclass of cases, are not to be restrained by applying to those cases an implication drawn from subsequentwords ; unless that implication be very clear, necessary, and irresistible. Faw v. Marsteller, 2 Cranch,10; 1 Cond. Rep. 337.

Where a case is shown to be out of the mischief intended to be guarded against, or out of the spiritof the law ; the letter of the statute will not be deemed so unequivocal as absolutely to exclude anotherconstruction. Ibid.

It is said the case ought to be an extraordinary one, that the circumstances ought to be uncommon,which would warrant a departure from the general principles established for the government of con-tracts. This is true, and the Supreme Court would certainly not feel itself at liberty to exercise, on acommon occasion, a discretionary power, limited only by the opinion entertained of the naked justiceof the case. Ibid.

That a law is the best expositor of itself; that every part of an act is to be taken into view for thepurpose of discovering the mind of the legislature; and that the details of one part may contain regu-lations restricting the extent of general expressions used in another part of the same act; are amongthose plain rules laid down by common sense for the exposition of statutes, which have been uniformlyacknowledged. Pennington v. Coxe, 2 Cranch, 33 ; 1 Cond. Rep. 346.

It is undoubtedly a well-established principle in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to beconsidered, and the intention of the legislature to be extracted from the whole. It is also true that

Proviso.

On manufac-tures of wool,or of which woolis a componentpart.