TWENTY-SECOND CONGRESS. Sess. I. Ch. 227. 1832.

585

Third. On all manufactures of cotton, or of which cotton shall be acomponent part, twenty-five per centum ad valorem, excepting cottontwist, yarn, and thread, which shall remain at the rate of duty fixed bythe act to amend the several acts imposing duties on imports, of twenty-

where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, that construction is to be avoided ;unless the meaning of the legislature be plain ; in which case it must be obeyed. United States v.Fisher et al., Assignees of Blight, 2 Cranch, 358 ; 1 Cond. Rep. 421.

That the consequences are to be considered in expounding laws, where the intent is doubtful, is aprinciple not to be contradicted; but it is also true, that it is a principle which must be applied with caution;and which has a degree of influence dependent on the nature of the case to which it is applied, whenrights are infringed. Ibid.

Where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed from,the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice tosuppose a design to effect such objects. But when only a political regulation is made which is incon-venient ; if the intention of the legislature be expressed in terms which are sufficiently intelligible toleave no doubt in the mind, when the words are taken in their ordinary sense ; it would be going a greatway to say that a constrained interpretation must be put upon them, to avoid an inconvenience whichought to have been contemplated in the legislature, when the act was passed; and which, in theiropinion, was probably overbalanced by the particular advantages it was calculated to produce. Ibid.

In cases depending on the statutes of a state, the settled construction of these statutes, by the statecourts, is to be regarded. Polk’s Lessee u. Wendal, 9 Cranch, 87; 3 Cond. Rep. 286.

In the construction of the statutes or local laws of a state, it is frequently necessary to recur to thehistory and situation of the country, in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of many ofthem, to enable a court to apply with propriety the different rules for construing statutes. Prestonv. Browder, 1 Wheat. 115; 3 Cond. Rep. 508.

The best judges in England have been of opinion, that relaxing the construction of the statute offrauds ought not to be extended further than it has already been carried ; and the Supreme Court entirelyconcurs in that opinion. Grant v. Naylor, 4 Cranch, 224 ; 2 Cond. Rep. 95.

An act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possibleconstruction remains; and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affectneutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations, as understood in this country. Mur-ray v. The Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch, 64; 1 Cond. Rep. 358.

When an act of Congress is revived by a subsequent act, it is revived precisely in that form, and withthat effect, which it had at the moment when it expired. The cargo of the Brig Aurora v. The UnitedStates , 7 Cranch, 382; 2 Cond. Rep. 549.

It is a general rule, in the construction of public statutes, that the word <e may” is to be construedts must,” in all cases where the legislature mean to impose a positive and absolute duty, and not merelyto give a discretionary power. And in all cases, the construction should be such as carries into effectthe true intent and meaning of the legislature in the enactment. Minor et al. v. The Mechanics’ Bankof Alexandria, 1 Peters, 46.

Where English statutes, such for instance as the statute of frauds, and the statute of Jimitations, havebeen adopted into our own legislation ; the known and settled construction of those statutes by English courts of law has been considered as silently incorporated into the acts; or has been received withall the weight of authority. Pennock v. Dialogue et al., 2 Peters, 1.

Where the question upon the construction of the statute of a state relative to real property has beensettled by any judicial decision in the state where the land lies; the Supreme Court , upon the uniformprinciples adopted by it, would recognise that decision as a part of the local law. Gardner v. Collins,2 Peters, 58.

A legislative act is to be interpreted according to the intention of the legislature, apparent upon itsface. Every technical rule as to the construction or force of particular terms, must yield to the clearexpression of the paramount will of the legislature. Wilkinson v. Leland et al., 2 Peters, 627.

In cases not absolutely closed by authority, the Supreme Courthas always expressed a strong inclina-tion not to extend the operation of the statute of frauds so as to embrace original and distinct promises,made by different persons at the same time, upon the same general consideration. Townsley v. Sumrall,2 Peters, 182.

The Supreme Court has been often called upon to consider the sixteenth section of the judiciary actof 1789, and as often, either expressly or by the course of its decisions, has held that it is merely decla-ratory ; making no alteration whatever in the rules of equity on the subject of legal remedy. Boyce’sExecutors v. Grundy, 3 Peters, 210.

The rule which has uniformly been observed by the Supreme Court in construing statutes, is to adoptthe construction made by courts of the country, by whose legislature the statute was enacted. Thisrule may be susceptible of some modification, when applied to British statutes which are adopted inany of the states. By adopting them they become our own, as entirely as if they had been enacted bythe legislature of the state. Cathcartet al. v. Robinson, 5 Peters, 264.

The construction which British statutes had received in England at the time of their adoption in thiscountry, indeed to the time of the separation of this country from the British empire, may very properly beconsidered as accompanying the statutes themselves, and forming an integral part of them. But how-ever subsequent decisions may be respected, and certainly they are entitled to great respect, their absoluteauthority is not admitted. If the English courts vary their construction of a statute which is commonto both countries, we do not hold ourselves bound to fluctuate with them. Ibid.

Generally statutes are to be construed to operate in futuro, unless a retrospective effect be clearlyintended. Prince v. The United States , 2 Gallis, C. C. R. 204.

The word ( or’ has sometimes been construed to mean 4 and.’ Such construction has been clearlynecessary to give effect to a clause in a will, or to some legislative provision, but never to change acontract at pleasure. Douglass v. Eyre, Gilpin’s D. C. R. 148.

Manufacturesof cotton, or ofpart cotton.

1824, ch. 136.