586

TWENTY-SECOND CONGRESS. Sess. I. Ch. 227. 1832.

Proviso. second May, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-four ; And provided,That all manufactures of cotton, or of which cotton shall be a compo-nent part, not dyed, colored, printed, or stained, not exceeding in valuethirty cents the square yard, shall be valued at thirty cents per square

Where a British statute is re-enacted in this country, it is reasonable to suppose that the legislaturedesigned to adopt, as well the settled construction which had been given to the act by the British courts,as the act itself. Kirkpatrick et al. v. Gibson’s Executors, 2 Brockenb. C. C. R. 388.

In doubtful cases, a court should compare all the parts of a statute, and different statutes in pari ma-teria, to ascertain the intention of the legislature. The Sloop Elizabeth, Paines’s C. C. R. 11.

Semble : That in questions of commercial law the courts of the United States are not concluded bythe local construction proceeding from state courts. Donnell v. The American Ins. Co., 2 Sumner’s C.C. R. 366.

In the construction of statutes, one part must be construed by another. In order to attest the legis-lative intention, the whole statute must be inspected. Strode v. Stafford Justices, 1 Brockenb. C. C.R. 162.

It is a rule of law that a statute applicable in its terms to particular actions, cannot be applied byconstruction to other actions standing on the same reasons. Jacob v. The United States , 1 Brockenb.C. C.R. 520.

Penal laws must be construed strictly to bring the case within the definition of the law, but not so asto exclude a case within their ordinary acceptation. The United States v. Wilson and Porter, 1 Baldwin’sC. C.R. 78.

Laws are construed strictly to save a right, or avoid a penalty; and liberally to give a remedy, oreffect an object declared in the law. Whitney et al. v. Emmett et al., 1 Baldwin’s C. C. R. 316.

The provisions of a law which are merely directory, are not to be construed into conditions precedent.Ibid.

The mercantile terms are to be taken in the sense intended, which is to be ascertained by the laws inpari materia. The United States v. Twenty-four Coils of Cordage , 1 Baldwin’s C. C. R. 505.

The words of a law imposing a forfeiture or penalty, should not be construed to embrace a case notwithin the parts of the law which prohibits the aetdone, or direct the performance of an act, by theomission of which the penalty or forfeiture is incurred. Ibid. 508.

If a section of an act of Congress -admits of two interpretations, one of which brings it within, andthe other pushes it beyond the constitutional authority of Congress ; it is the duty of the SupremeCourt to adopt the former construction j because a presumption never ought to be indulged, that Con-gress meant to exercise or usurp any unconstitutional authority ; unless that construction is forced onthe court by language altogether incongruous. The United States v. Combe, 12 Peters, 72.

Upon the general principles of interpreting statutes, when the words are general, the court are notat liberty to insert limitations not called for by the sense, or the objects, or the mischiefs of the enact-ment. Ibid.

The office of a proviso, generally, is either to except something from the enacting clause, or to qualifyor restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of misinterpretation of its extending tocases not intended by the legislature to be brought within its purview. Ibid.

The court in construing an act will not consider the motives, or reasons, or opinions, expressed byindividual members of Congress in debate, but will look, if necessary, to the public history of the timesin which it was passed. Aldridge et al. v. Williams, 3 Howard, 1.

An act of Congress imposing a duty upon imports, must be construed to describe the article uponwhich the duty is imposed according to the commercial understanding of the terms used in the law, inour own markets, at the time when the law was passed. Curtis v. Martin, 3 Howard, 106.

Revenue laws for the prevention of fraud, for the suppression of a public wrong, or to effect a publicgood, are not in a strict sense penal statutes, although they impose a penalty. But they ought to be soconstrued as most effectually to accomplish the intention of the legislature, in passing them, instead ofbeing construed with great strictness in favour of the defendant. Taylor et al. t. The United States ,3 Howard, 197.

A clause of forfeiture in a law is to be construed differently from a similar clause in an engagementbetween individuals. A legislature may impose it as a punishment, but individuals can only make it amatter of contract. The State ofMaryland v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company , 3 Howard, 534.

Statutes in pari materia, should be taken into consideration in construing a law. If a thing containedin a subsequent statute be within the reason of a former statute, it shall be taken to be within themeaning of that statute. The United States v. Freeman, 3 Howard, 556.

If it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari materia, what meaning the legislature attached tothe words of a former statute, this will amount to a legislative declaration of its meaning, and will governthe construction of the first statute. Ibid.

The meaning of the legislature may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, from thereason or motive on which the legislature proceeded, from the end in view, or the purpose which wasdesigned ; the limitation of the rule being that to extend the meaning in any case not included withinthe words, the case must be shown to come within the same reason upon which the law-maker proceeded,and not a like reason. Ibid.

In affirmative statutes, such part of a prior as may be incorporated into the subsequent statute, asconsistent with it, must be considered in force. Davies v. Fairbairn, 3 Howard, 636.

If a subsequent statute be not repugnant in all its provisions to a prior one, yet if the latter statuteclearly intended to prescribe the only rules which should govern, it repeals the prior one. Ibid.

In the construction of penal statutes, the proper course is to search out and follow the true intentof the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context, and promotes, in thefullest manner, the apparent policy and objects of the legislature. The United States v. Weaver,3 Sumner’s C. C. R. 208.

In construing an act of Congress , if there be a mistake apparent on the face of the act, which may