MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.

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of the turnpike. Before leaving Grafton the rumors he heard had made h i mestimate Garnett’s force at 6000 or 7000 men, of which the larger part were atLaurel Mountain in front of General Morris. On the 6th of July he movedMcCook with two regiments to Middle Fork Bridge, about half-way toBeverly, and on the same day ordered Morris to march with his brigadefrom Philippi to a position one and a half miles in front of Garnett’s princi-pal camp, which was promptly done. Three days later, McClellan concen-trated the three brigades of his own column at Boaring Creek, about twomiles from Colonel Pegram’s position at the base of Rich Mountain. Theadvance on both lines had been made with only a skirmishing resistance, theConfederates being aware of McClellan’s great superiority in numbers, andchoosing to await his attack in their fortified positions. The National com-mander was now convinced that his opponent was 10,000 strong, of whichabout 2000 were before hi m at Rich Mountain. A reconnoissance made onthe 10th showed that Pegram’s position would be difficult to assail in front,but preparations were made to attack the next day, while Morris was directedto hold fir m ly his position before Garnett, watching for the effect of theattack at Rich Mountain. In the evening Roseerans took to McClellan ayoung man named Hart, whose father lived on the top of the mountain twomiles in rear of Pegram, and who thought he could guide a column ofinfantry to his father’s farm by a circuit around Pegram’s left flank south of theturnpike. The paths were so difficult that cannon could not go by them, hutRoseerans offered to lead a column ofinfantry and seize the road at the Hartfarm. After some discussion McClellanadopted the suggestion, and it wasarranged that Roseerans should march* at daybreak of the 11th with abouttwo thousand men, including a troopof horse, and that upon the sound ofhis engagement in the rear of Pegram,

McClellan would attack in force infront. By a blunder in one of theregimental camps, the reveille andassembly were sounded at midnight,and Pegram was put on the qui vive.

He, however, believed that the attemptto turn his position would he by a pathor country road passing round hisright, between him and Garnett (ofwhich the latter had warned him), andhis attention was diverted from Rose-crans’s actual route, which he thoughtimpracticable. The alert which hadoccurred at midnight made Roseeransthink it best to make a longer circuit

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