202

THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

Johnston’s forces. But while on the 19th I was awaiting a renewed and gen-eral attack by the Federal army, I received a telegram from the Richmond military authorities, urging me to withdraw my call on General Johnston onaccount of the supposed impracticability of the concentration — an abidingconviction which had been but momentarily shaken by the alarm caused byMcDowell’s march upon Richmond.\ As this was not an order in terms, butan urgency which, notwithstanding its superior source, left me technicallyfree and could define me as responsible for any misevent, I preferred to keepboth the situation and the responsibility, and continued every effort for theprompt arrival of the Shenandoah forces, being resolved, should they comebefore General McDowell again attacked, to take myself the offensive. Gen-eral McDowell, fortunately for my plans, spent the 19th and 20th in recon-noissances; A and, meanwhile, General Johnston brought 8340 men fromthe Shenandoah Valley, with 20 guns, and General Holmes 1265 rank andfile, with 6 pieces of artillery, from Aquia Creek. As these forces arrived(most of them in the afternoon of the 20th) I placed them chiefly so asto strengthen my left center and left, the latter being weak from lack ofavailable troops.

The disposition of the entire force was now as follows [see map, page180]: At Union Mills Ford, Ewell’s brigade, supported by Holmes’s; atMcLean’s Ford, D. R. Jones’s brigade, supported by Early’s; at Blackburn’sFord, Longstreet’s brigade; at Mitchell’s Ford, Bonham’s brigade. Cocke’s bri-gade held the line in front and rear of Bull Run from Bonham’s left, coveringLewis’s, Ball’s, and Island fords, to the right of Evans’s demi-brigade, whichcovered the Stone Bridge and a farm ford about a mile above, and formedpart also of Cocke’s command. The Shenandoah forces were placed inreserve — Bee’s and Bartow’s brigades between McLean’s and Blackburn’sfords, and Jackson’s between Blackburn’s and Mitchell’s fords. This forcemustered 29,188 rank and file and 55 guns, of which 21,923 infantry, cavalry,and artillery, with 29 guns, belonged to my immediate forces, i. e., the Armyof the Potomac. '

The preparation, in front of an ever-threatening enemy, of a wholly volun-teer army, composed of men very few of whom had ever belonged to anymilitary organization, had been a work of many cares not incident to thecommand of a regular army. These were increased by the insufficiency ofmy staff organization, an inefficient management of the quartermaster’sdepartment at Richmond , and the preposterous mismanagement of the com-missary-general, who not only failed to furnish rations, but caused theremoval of the army commissaries, who, under my orders, procured food from

\ [telegram.] Richmond , July 19, 1861.General Beauregard, Manassas, Va .

We have no intelligence from General Johnston.If the enemy in front of you has abandoned animmediate attack, and General Johnston has notmoved, you had better withdraw your call uponhim, so that he may be left to his full discretion.All the troops arriving at Lynchburg are orderedto join you. From this place we will send as fast

as transportation permits. The enemy is advisedat Washington of the projected movement of Gen-erals Johnston and Holmes, and may vary hisplans in conformity thereto.

S. Cooper, Adjutant-General.

Lack of rations, as well as the necessity forinformation, detained McDowell at Centrevilleduring these two days.— Editors.