THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

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the country in front of ns to keep the army from absolute want—suppliesthat were otherwise exposed to be gathered by the enemy. So speciallysevere had been the recent duties at headquarters, aggravated not a little bynight alarms arising from the enemy’s immediate presence, that, in the even-ing of the 20th, I found my chief-of-staff sunken upon the papers that coveredhis table, asleep in sheer exhaustion from the overstraining and almost slum-berless labor of the last days and nights. I covered his door with a guardto secure his rest against any interruption, after which the army had thebenefit of his usual active and provident services.

There was much in this decisive conflict about to open, not involved inany after battle, which pervaded the two armies and the people behind themand colored the responsibility of the respective commanders. The politicalhostilities of a generation were now face to face with weapons instead ofwords. Defeat to either side would be a deep mortification, but defeat to theSouth must turn its claim of independence into an empty vaunt; and thedefeated commander on either side might expect, though not the personalfate awarded by the Carthaginians to an unfortunate commander, at least amoral fate quite similar. Though disappointed that the concentration I hadsought had not been permitted at the moment and for the purpose preferredby me, and notwithstanding the non-arrival of some five thousand troops ofthe Shenandoah forces, my strength was now so increased that I had goodhope of successfully meeting my adversary.

General Johnston was the ranking officer, and entitled, therefore, to assumecommand of the united forces; but as the extensive field of operations wasone which I had occupied since the beginning of June, and with which I wasthoroughly familiar in all its extent and military bearings, while he waswholly unacquainted with it, and, moreover, as I had made my plans and dis-positions for the maintenance of the position, General Johnston, in view ofthe gravity of the impending issue, preferred not to assume the responsi-bilities of the chief direction of the forces during the battle, but to assist meupon the field. Thereupon, I explained my plans and purposes, to whichhe agreed.,)

Sunday, July 21st, bearing the fate of the new-born Confederacy, brokebrightly over the fields and woods that held the hostile forces. My scouts,thrown out in the night toward Centreville along the Warrenton Turnpike, hadreported that the enemy was concentrating along the latter. This fact,together with the failure of the Federals in their attack upon my center atMitchell’s and Blackburn’s fords, had caused me to apprehend that they wouldattempt my left flank at the Stone Bridge, and orders were accordingly issuedby half-past 4 o’clock to the brigade commanders to hold their forces inreadiness to move at a moment’s notice, together with the suggestion that theFederal attack might be expected in that quarter. Shortly afterward theenemy was reported to be advancing from Centre ville on the Warrenton

J See General Beauregard’s postscript (page 226), and General Johnston’s consideration of thesame topic in the paper to follow (page 245), and his postscript (page 258).— Editors.