244

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.

is idle now. The use of the wagons required in the march of the army wouldhave been necessary to remove the sick to the railroad station at Strasburg,eighteen miles distant; so this removal could not have been made after themarch. There being seventeen hundred sick, this part of their transportationwould have required more time than the transfer of the troops to Manas-sas , which was the important thing. The sick were, therefore, properly andquickly provided for in Winchester. I was the only judge of the “practicable”;and “ if practicable” refers to the whole sentence—as much to sending the sickto Culpeper as to “ make the movement.” Still he says (“R. and F.,” I., 347):

“His [my] letters of the 12th and 15th expressed his doubts about his power to retire frombefore the superior force of General Patterson. Therefore, the word ‘ practicable ’ was in thatconnection the equivalent of ‘ possible.’ ”

It is immaterial whether “ if practicable ” or “ if possible ” was written. Iwas the only judge of the possibility or practicability; and, if General Pat-terson had not changed his position after the telegram was received, I mighthave thought it necessary to attack him, to “ make the movement practicable.”But as to my power to retire. On the 15th General Patterson’s forces werehalf a day’s march from us, and on the 12th more than a day’s march; and,as Stuart’s cavalry did not permit the enemy to observe us, retreat wouldhave been easy, and I could not possibly have written to the contrary.\

As to Mr. Davis ’s telegram (“R. and F.,” I., 348) A, and the anxiety inMr. Davis ’s mind lest there should be some unfortunate misunderstandingbetween General Beauregard and me,—my inquiry Avas intended and calcu-lated to establish beyond dispute our relative positions. As a Confederatebrigadier-general I had been junior to General Beauregard, but had beencreated general by act of Congress . But, as this had not been published tothe army, it was not certain that it was known at Manassas . If it was not,the President’s telegram gave the information, and prevented what he seemsto have apprehended.

THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN.

On page 349, to the end of the chapter, the President describes his visit tothe field of battle near Manassas . “As we advanced,” he says, “ the storm ofbattle was rolling westward.” But, in fact, the fighting had ceased before heleft Manassas . He then mentions meeting me on a hill which commanded ageneral view of the field, and proceeding farther west, where he saw a Federal“ column,” which a Confederate squadron charged and put to flight. But the

\ Mr. Davis has a few words of praise for Gen-eral Johnston, which, in this connection, will beof interest to the reader: “ It gives me pleasureto state that, from all the accounts received at thetime, the plans of General Johnston for maskinghis withdrawal to form a junction with GeneralBeauregard were conducted with marked skill ”(“B. and F.,” I., 347).— Editors.

■fc This telegram, sent in response to an inquiryfrom General Johnston, read as follows :

“Richmond , July 20, 1861. General J. E. John-ston, Manassas Junction, Virginia : You are a gen-era] in the Confederate Army, possessed of thepower attaching to that rank. You will know howto make the exact knowledge of Brigadier-Gen-eral Beauregard, as well of the ground as of thetroops and preparation, avail for the success ofthe object in which you cooperate. The zeal ofboth assures me of harmonious action. JeffersonDavis .”