RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.

245

captain in command of tills squadron says in Ms report that the column seenwas a party of onr troops. Mr. Davis also dilates on the suffering of ourtroops for want of supplies and camp equipage, and on his efforts to havethem provided for. After the battle ended, officers were duly directed by meto have food brought to the ground where the troops were to pass the night.

I was not in the conference described by Mr. Davis (“E. and F.,” I., 353,354, 355). Having left the field after 10 o’clock, and ridden in the dark slowly,it was about half-past 11 when I found the President and General Beauregardtogether, in the latter’s quarters at Manassas . We three conversed an houror more without referring to pursuit or an advance upon Washington. The“ conference ” described by him must have occurred before my arrival, andMr. Davis may very well have forgotten that I was not present then.

But, when the President wrote, he had forgotten the subject of the confer-ence he described; for the result, as he states it, was an order, not for pursuitby the army, but for the detail of two parties to collect wounded men andabandoned property near the field of battle. This order (pages 355, 356) is“to the same effect,” Mr. Davis says, as the one he wrote, and which he termsa direction to pursue the Federal army at early dawn.

It is asserted (“ E. and F.,” I., 354) | that I left the command over both Con-federate armies in General Beauregard’s hands during the engagement. Suchconduct would have been as base as flight from the field in the heat of battle,and would have brought upon me the contempt of every honorable soldier. Itis disproved by the fact that General Beauregard was willing to serve under methere, and again in North Carolina , near the close of the war; and that heassociated with me. As this accusation is published by the Southern Pres-ident, and indorsed by General Beauregard, it requires my contradiction.

Instead of leaving the command in General Beauregard’s hands, I assumedit over both armies immediately after my arrival on the 20th, showing GeneralBeauregard as my warrant the President’s telegram defining my position.The usual order J) assuming command was written and sent to GeneralBeauregard’s office for distribution. He was then told that as GeneralPatterson would no doubt hasten to join General McDowell as soon as hediscovered my movement, we must attack the Federal army next morning.General Beauregard then pointed out on a map of the neighborhood the roadsleading to the enemy’s camp at Centreville from the different parts of ourline south of the stream, and the positions of the brigades near each road;and a simple order of march, by which our troops would unite near theFederal position, was sketched. Having had neither sleep nor recumbentrest since the morning of the 17th, I begged General Beauregard to put thisorder of march on paper, and have the necessary copies made and sent to mefor inspection in a grove, near, where I expected to be resting—this in time

& Captain John F. Lay. See “ Official Becords,” events, says: “During the 20th, General JohnstonII., 573.— Editors. arrived at Manassas Junction by the railroad, and

t Not by Mr. Davis, but in a letter from Gen- that day we received the order from him assumingeral Thomas Jordan, quoted by Mr. Davis for an- command of the combined armies of Generalother purpose.— Editors. Beauregard and himself.”— J. E. J.

j> General J. A. Early, in his narrative of these