RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.

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for distribution before night. This distribution was to be by him, the imme-diate commander of most of the troops. Seeing that 8 brigades were on theright of the line to Centreville, and but 1 to the left of it at a distance of 4miles, I desired General Beauregard to have Bee’s and Jackson’s brigadesplaced in this interval near the detached brigade.

The papers were brought to me a little before sunrise next morning. Theydiffered greatly from the order sketched the day before; but as they wouldhave put the troops in motion if distributed, it would have been easy thento direct the course of each division. By the order sketched the day before,all our forces would have been concentrated near Centreville, to attack theFederal army. By that prepared by General Beauregard but 4 brigadeswere directed “ to the attack of Centreville,” of which one and a half had notyet arrived from the Valley , while 6 brigades were to move forward to theUnion Mills and Centreville road, there to hold themselves in readiness tosupport the attack on Centreville, or to move, 2 to Sangster’s cross-roads, 2to Fairfax Station, and 2 to Fairfax Court House. The two and a half bri-gades on the ground, even supported by the half brigade of the reserve alsoon the ground, in all probability would have been defeated by the wholeFederal army before the three bodies of 2 brigades each could have come totheir aid, over distances of from 3 to 5 miles. Then, if the enemy had provi-dentially been defeated by one-sixth or one-eighth of their number, Sangster’scross-roads and Fairfax Station would have been out of their line of retreat.

Soon after sunrise on the 21st, it was reported that a large body of Federaltroops was approaching on the Warrenton Turnpike. This offensive move-ment of the enemy would have frustrated our plan of the day before , if theorders for it had been delivered to the troops. It appears from the reports ofthe commanders of the six brigades on the right that but one of them, GeneralLongstreet, received it. Learning that Bee’s and Jackson’s brigades werestill on the right, I again desired General Beauregard to transfer them to theleft, which he did, giving the same orders to Hampton’s Legion, just arrived.These, with Cocke’s brigade then near the turnpike, would necessarily receivethe threatened attack.

General Beauregard then suggested that all our troops on the right shouldmove rapidly to the left and assail the attacking Federal troops in flank.This suggestion was accepted; and together we joined those troops. Threeof the four brigades of the first line, at Mitchell’s, Blackburn’s, and McLean’sfords, reported strong bodies of United States troops on the wooded heightsbefore them. This frustrated the second plan. Two Federal batteries — onein front of Bonham’s brigade at Mitchell’s Ford, the other before Longstreet’sat Blackburn’s Ford — were annoying us, although their firing was slow.

About 8 o’clock, after receiving such information as scouts could give, Ileft General Beauregard near Longstreet’s position, and placed myself onLookout Hill, in rear of Mitchell’s Ford, to await the development of theenemy’s designs. About 9 o’clock the signal officer, Captain Alexander,reported that a column of Federal troops could be seen crossing the valley ofBull Bun, two miles beyond our left.