RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.

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live stock besides. On the 9th of March, when the ground had become firmenough for military operations, I ordered the army to march that night,thinking then, as I do now, that the space of fifteen days was time enough inwhich to subordinate an army to the Commissary Department. About onemillion pounds of this provision was abandoned, and half as much more wasspoiled for want of shelter. This loss is represented (“ R. and F.,” I., 468) \as so great as to embarrass us to the end of the war, although it was onlya six days’ supply for the troops then in Virginia . Ten times as much was inNorth Carolina railroad stations at the end of the war. Mr. Davis says (p. 467):

“ It was regretted that earlier and more effective means were not employed for the mobiliza-tion of the army, . . . or at least that the withdrawal was not so deliberate as to secure the

removal of our ordnance, subsistence, and quartermaster’s stores.”

The quartermaster’s and ordnance stores were brought off; and as to sub-sistence, the Government, which collected immediately on the frontier fivetimes the quantity of provisions wanted, is responsible for the losses. ThePresident suggested the time of the withdrawal himself, in the interview in hisoffice that has been mentioned. The means taken was the only one available,—the Virginia Midland Rail road. Mr. Davis says (“R. and F.,” I., 465):

“ To further inquiry from General Johnston as to where he should take position, I replied thatI would go to his headquarters in the field, and found him on the south bank of the river, towhich he had retired, in a position possessing great natural advantages.”

There was no correspondence in relation to selecting a defensive position.I was not seeking one; but, instead, convenient camping-grounds, fromwhich my troops could certainly unite with other Confederate forces to meetMcClellan ’s invasion. I had found and was occupying such grounds, onedivision being north of Orange Court House, another a mile or two south ofit, and two others some six miles east of that place; a division on the southbank of the Rappahannock, and the cavalry beyond the river, and about 13,000troops in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. Mr. Davis’s narrative [of a visitto Fredericksburg at this time, the middle of March.— Editors] that followsis disposed of by the proof that, after the army left Manassas , the Presidentdid not visit it until about the 14th of May. A But such a visit, if made, couldnot have brought him to the conclusion that the weakness of Fredericksburgas a military position made it unnecessary to find a strong one for the army.

Mr. Davis (“R. and F.,” II., 81) credits me with expecting an attackwhich he shows General McClellan never had in his mind:

“ Iu a previous chapter, the retreat of our army from CentreviUe has been described, and ref-erence has been made to the anticipation of the commanding general, J. E. Johnston, that theenemy would soon advance to attack that position.”

This refers, I suppose, to a previous assertion (“ R. and F.,” I., 462), mycomments upon which prove that this “ anticipation ” was expressed in the

\Not by Mr. Davis, but iu a statement quoted -fo In “The Century” magazine for May, 1885,at the above page from General J. A. Early, who General Johnston, to support his assertion, quotedsaid, “ The loss . . . was a very serious one to us, statements by Major J. B. Washington, Dr. A. M.and embarrassed us for the remainder of the war, Fauntleroy, and Colonel E. J. Harvie, which areas it put us at once on a running stock.”— Editors, now omitted for want of space.— Editors,vol. I. 17