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RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRST BULL RUN.

President’s letter to me, dated February 28th, 1862. He says (“ R. and F.,”II., 83):

“ The withdrawal of our forces across the Rappahannock was fatal to the [Federal] programmeof landing on that river and marching to Richmond before our forces could be in position toresist an attack on the capital.”

This withdrawal was expressly to enable the army to unite with other Con-federate troops to oppose the expected invasion. I supposed that GeneralMcClellan would march down the Potomac on the Maryland side, cross itnear the mouth of Aquia Creek, and take the Fredericksburg route to Rich-mond. The position of Hooker, about midway between Washington andthis crossing-place, might well have suggested that he had this intention.

Postceipt. — In the first paragraph of Greneral Beauregard’s postcript, it isasserted that I did not claim to have commanded in the first battle of Manas-sas until May, 1885, and that my official report of that action contains nosuch claim. It is, nevertheless, distinctly expressed in that report — thus:

“In a brief and rapid conference, General Beauregard was assigned to the command of theleft, which, as the younger officer, he claimed, while I returned to that of the whole field.”

And in “Johnston’s Narrative,” published in 1874, it is expressed in thesewords, on page 49:

“After assigning General Beauregard to the command of the troops immediately engaged ,which he properly suggested belonged to the second in rank, not to the commander of the army,I returned to the supervision of the whole field.”

So much for my not having claimed to have commanded at the “ firstManassas ” until May, 1885.

General Beauregard in his official report states the circumstance thus:

. .1 urged General Johnston to leave the immediate conduct of the field to me, whilehe, repairing to Portici, the Lewis house , should urge reenforcements forward.”

This language would certainly limit his command as mine does. He didnot attempt to command the army, while I did command it, and disposedof all the troops not engaged at the time of his assignment.

In his official report of the battle, General Beauregard further states:

“ Made acquainted with my plan of operations and dispositions to meet the enemy, he gavethem his entire approval, and generously directed their execution under my command.”

The only “plan” that he offered me [to move via Aldie] was rejected —on the 14th, before my arrival. The battle fought was on McDowell’s plan,not General Beauregard’s. The proof of this is, that at its commencementlittle more than a regiment of Beauregard’s command was on the groundwhere the battle was fought, and, of his 7 brigades, 1 was a mile and 6 werefrom 4 to 7 or 8 miles from it. The place of the battle was fixed by Bee’s andJackson’s brigades, sent forward by my direction. At my request GeneralBeauregard did write an order of march against the Federal army, finished alittle before sunrise of the 21st. In it I am invariably termed commander-in-chief, and he (to command one of the wings) “ second in command,” or GeneralBeauregard—conclusive proof that the troops were not “under his command.”