THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSARIAT AT MANASSAS.
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Lastly, General Beauregard, in his official report,gives as his reason for countermanding the move-ment begun by Ewell at 10 o’clock, that in hisjudgment it would require quite three hours for thetroops to get into position for attack. Had themessenger dispatched at 8 been prompt, Ewell
might have had his orders by 9. But at 9 we findBeauregard in rear of Mitchell’s Ford, waitingfor an attack -which, by his own figures, he shouldnot have expected before 12.
It is not for me to reconcile these contradic-tions.
THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSARIAT AT MANASSAS.
BY COLONEL L. B. NORTHROP, COMMISSARY-GENERAL, C. S. A.
Generals Beauregard, Imboden, and Johnstonin the foregoing articles [see pages 221, 239, and256] criticise the management of my departmentin the matter of supplies for the Confederatearmy at Manassas either before or after the firstbattle. In the statements of these generals, thereis some conflict, but they all concur in making meappear a preposterous imbecile, whom Mr. Daviswas guilty of retaining. General Imboden ineffect charges Mr. Benjamin with suppressing, inorder to shield my incapacity, an official report ofa board of officers convened by Johnston.
July 29th, 1861, General Beauregard wrote tohis aides, Colonels Chesnut and Miles,—the latterread the letter in the Confederate Congress,—about his vision of capturing Washington, andthus laid the foundation of the cabal against Mr.Davis which made the Confederate Government a“divided house.” It produced a resolution ofinquiry, followed soon by a standing committee,and afterward, in January, 1865, by a unanimousresolution, in secret session of both houses, toappoint a joint select committee to investigatethe condition and management of all the Bureauxof the War Department . The session of this com-mittee on commissary affairs was held January23d, 1865. During the war the investigationsof the standing committee into my policy andmethods were frequent; several were long takingtestimony, for one member, H. S. Foote,—whowhen I was myself in prison published me as cruelto Federal prisoners,—was ever zealous to attack.Every investigation ended in approval. I have aletter from Mr. JohnB. Baldwin, chairman of thejoint select committee, stating that he had declaredin Congress, as the result of their examination,“ that the commissary department of subsistence,under the control of Colonel Northrop, the Commis-sary-General, had been managed with a foresightand sagacity, and a far-reaching, comprehensivegrasp of its business, such as we had found in noother bureau connected with the army supply,with perhaps a single exception.”
The facts are that the engineer, General Beau-regard, neglected his communications, so that“troops for the battle” and “supplies” were“retarded” ; but the supplies were at the depot.“ Eighteen heavy cannon, called for two weeksbefore,” occupied unloaded cars at Fredericksburg,where there was a large supply of flour that hadbeen accumulating since early June. Numerouscars were retained as stationary storehouses “forprovisions,” “useless baggage,” and “trunks”;
one hundred and thirty-three cars were abstractedby the “military” power from the use of the rail-roads for two weeks and more before the battleuntil returned by the Quartermaster-General andMr. Ashe, the Government agent. There was plentyof lumber available to construct a storehouse. Gen-eral Beauregard was not “ urgent on the Commis-sary-General for adequate supplies before the bat-tle,” for there was no ground of complaint. It wasafter the battle, when the vision of capturing Wash-ington had seduced him, that he tried to constructa ground of complaint anterior to the battle.
General Beauregard made but one demand on me(July 8th, by a telegram which I have) for a com-missary of the old service. Lieutenant-ColonelRichard B. Lee was added; no one was removed.On the 6th day of July I ordered Fowle to buy allthe corn-meal, and soon after all the bacon, hecould. July 7th, Beauregard ordered him to keepin advance a two weeks’ supply for 25,000 men,and Major Noland was ready to supply any numberof beeves. The findings of the Board (on whichColonel Lee sat) are incoherent as stated byImboden. The interdictions alleged by him arerefuted by Colonel Ruffin (my chief assistant), andby all the letters sent officially to me in August,1861. I have Fowle’s detailed report of the ra-tions at Manassas ; there was plenty of provisionfor a march on Washington. If I had removed hiscommissaries as he alleges, or had “ interdicted ”them as General Imboden states, General Beau-regard need not have been hampered, in a countrywhich all the generals have declared abounded inthe essentials of food.
General Johnston’s comments on the commis-sariat are unfounded. He “requested” an in-crease of provisions which his commissary alonecould determine, and allowed the accumulation togo on for twelve days after he knew that he hadmore than he wanted. When I was informed, Idid what he should have done — telegraphed theshippers to stop. Two weeks before his move hepromised my officer, Major Noland, the transpor-tation deemed sufficient, and of which he had as-sumed direct control. Empty trains passed themeat which had been laid in piles, ready for ship-ment. Empty trains lay idle at Manassas fordays, in spite of Noland’s efforts to get them.General Johnston says the stores of the other de-partmen ts were brought off. Eight hundred newarmy saddles, several thousand pairs of new shoes,and a large number of new blankets were burned—Quartermaster’s stores then difficult of attainment.