26 o
GENERAL EWELL AT BULL RUN.
of orders to reach him ; that no such message wasreceived from D. R. Jones as is here ascribed tohim; and that the order sent hack by Beauregardto Ewell was not one to advance, but to retire froman advance already begun.
It is not easy to understand these mistakes, asGeneral Beauregard has twice given a tolerably ac-curate though meager account of the matter — oncein his official report, and once in his biography pub-lished by Colonel Roman in 1884. Neither of theseaccounts can be reconciled with the later attitude.
Upon reading General Beauregard’s article, Iwrote to General Fitzhugh Lee , who was Ewell’sassistant adjutant-general at Manassas , asking hisrecollection of what took place. I have liberty tomake the following extracts from his reply. Afterstating what troops composed the brigade, he goeson:
“ These troops were all iu position at daylight on the21st July, ready for any duty, and held the extremeright of General Beauregard’s line of battle along BullRun, at Union Mills. As hour after hour passed, GeneralEwell grew impatient at not receiving any orders (be-yond those to he ready to advance, which came at sun-rise), and sent me between 9 and 10 A. m. to see GeneralD. R. Jones, who commanded the brigade next on hisleft at McLean’s Ford, to ascertain if that officer had anynews or had received any orders from army headquar-ters. I found General Jones malting preparations tocross Bull Run, and was told by him that, in the order hehad received to do so, it was stated that General Ewellhad been sent similar instructions.
“ Upon my report of these facts, General Ewell atonce issued the orders for his command to cross the Runand move out on the road to Centreville.”
General Lee then describes the recall across BullRun and the second advance of the brigade to makea demonstration toward Centreville, and adds thatthe skirmishers of Rodes’s 5th Alabama Regi-ment, which was in advance, had actually becomeengaged, when we were again recalled and orderedto “ move by the most direct route at once, and asrapidly as possible, for the Lewis house” — thefield of battle on the left. Ewell moved rapidly,
If there was an order sent me to advance before theone I received through General Jones, it is more thanlikely it would have been given to the same express.
Respectfully,
R. S. Ewell, B. G.
Manassas, Va. , July 26th, 1861.
General: Your letter of the 25th inst. is received. Ido not attach the slightest blame to you for the failureof the movement on Centreville, but to the guide whodid not deliver the order to move forward, sent at about8 a. m. to General Holmes and then to you — correspond-ing in every respect to the one sent to Generals Jones,Bonham, and Longstreet — only their movements weresubordinate to yours. Unfortunately no copy, in thehurry of the moment, was kept of said orders; and somany guides, about a dozen or more, were sent off indifferent directions, that it is next to impossible to findout who was the bearer of the orders referred to. Ourguides and couriers were the worst set I ever employed,whether from ignorance or over-anxiety to do well andquickly I cannot say; but many regiments lost theirway repeatedly on their way toward the field of battle,and of course I can attach no more blame to their com-manding officers than I could to you for not executingan order which I am convinced you did not get.
I am fully aware that you did all that could have beenexpected of you or your command. I merely expressed
sending General Lee and another officer ahead toreport and secure orders. On his arrival near thefield they brought instructions to halt, when heimmediately rode forward with them to GeneralBeauregard, “ and General Ewell begged GeneralBeauregard to be allowed to go in pursuit of theenemy, but his request was refused.”
As to the real causes of the miscarriage of Gen-eral Beauregard’s plan of attack there need belittle doubt. They are plainly stated by his imme-diate superior in command, General Joseph E.Johnston , in his official report, as being the “ earlymovements of the enemy on that morning and thenon-arrival of the expected troops ” from Harper’sFerry . He adds: ‘ ‘ General Beauregard afterwardproposed a modification of the abandoned plan,to attack with our right, while the left stoodon the defensive. This, too, became impractica-ble, and a battle ensued, different in place andcircumstances from any previous plan on our side.”
There are some puzzling circumstances con-nected with the supposed miscarriage of the orderfor our advance. The delay in sending it is unex-plained. General Beauregard says it was sent “atabout 8 A. M.,” but D. R. Jones had received hiscorresponding order at 10 minutes past 7, and firinghad begun at half-past 5.
The messenger was strangely chosen. It wasthe most important order of the day, for the move-ments of the army were to hinge on those of ourbrigade. There was no scarcity of competentstaff-officers; yet it was intrusted to “ a guide,”presumably an enlisted man, perhaps even a citi-zen, whose very name was unknown.
His instructions were peculiar. Time was all-important. He was ordered not to go direct toEwell, but first to make a d4tour to Holmes, wholay in reserve nearly two miles in our rear.
His disappearance is mysterious. He was neverheard of after receiving the order; yet his routelay wholly within our lines, over well-beaten roadsand far out of reach of the enemy.
my regret that my original plan could not be carried intoeffect, as it would have been a most complete victorywith only half the trouble and fighting.
The true cause of countermanding your forward move-ment after you had crossed was that it was then too late,as the enemy was about to annihilate our left flank, andhad to be met and checked there, for otherwise he wouldhave taken us in flank and rear and all -would have beenlost. Yours truly,
G. T. Beauregard.
General R. S. Ewell, Union Mills, Va .
P. S. Please read the above to Major James.
X. b. The order sent you at about 8 A. m., to com-mence the movement on Centreville, was addressed toGeneral Holmes and yourself, as he was to support you,but being nearer Camp Pickens, the headquarters, thanUnion Mills, where you were, it was to be communicatedto him first, and then to you; but he has informed methat it never reached him. With regard to the order sentyou in the afternoon to recross the Bull Run (to marchtoward the Stone Bridge), it was sent you by Genera] J.E. Johnston , as I am informed by him, for the purposeof supporting our left, if necessary. G. T. B.
Do not publish until we know what the enemy is goingto do—or reports are out —which I think will make itall right.