IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI.

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how to do it. This he did in the unpretending and kindly manner whichinvited suggestion, and which with him was characteristic. When I tookleave of him he accompanied me down the stairs, coming out to the steps ofthe portico. I asked him then if there was anything further in the wayof instruction that he wished to say to me. “No,” he answered. “I havegiven yon carte blanche. You must use your own judgment and do thebest yon can. I doubt if the states will ever come back.”

Governor Yates, of Illinois , then in Washington, informed me fully of theunarmed and unprepared condition of the West. I immediately began asearch for arms at Washington, and out of those at hand was able to obtainan order for only seven thousand stand.

Arriving at New York , I found that the order for the seven thousandstand of arms had been countermanded. Upon my complaint to Washing-ton, and through the personal interposition of the President, Major PeterV. Hagner was sent to aid me in procuring what I judged immediatelynecessary for my department. With him I arranged for gathering fromvarious arsenals and forwarding to St. Louis arms and equipments for23,000 men. This detained me some weeks in New York . Before leaving,I telegraphed to Lieutenant-General Scott, to ask if he had any instructionsto give me. He replied that he had none.

At Philadelphia we heard the news of the disaster of Bull Run. O 11the 25th of July I reached St. Louis , and at the start I found myself in anenemy’s country, the enemy’s flag displayed from houses and recruitingoffices. St. Louis was in sympathy with the South, and the State of Mis-souri was in active rebellion against the national authority. The Bull Rundefeat had been a damaging blow to the prestige of the Union.

In this condensed sketch I can give only the strong outline of the threaten-ing situation I found, and, in part, the chief measures I adopted to convertour defensive position into one that was vigorously offensive , going into detailonly enough to show some of the difficulties that beset me.

There was a wide difference between the situation here and that at Wash-ington. The army of the East was organized under the eyes of the Presidentand Congress; in the midst of loyal surroundings and loyal advisers wherethere was no need to go outside of prescribed military usage, or to assumeresponsibilities. But in Missouri all operations had to be initiated in themidst of upturned and revolutionary conditions and a rebellious people,where all laws were set at defiance. In addition to the bodies of armed menthat swarmed over the State, a Confederate force of nearly 50,000 men wasalready on the Southern frontier: Pillow, with 12,000, advancing uponCairo; Thompson, with 5000, upon Girardeau ; Hardee, with 5000, upon Iron-ton ; and Price, with an estimated force of 25,000, upon Lyon, at Springfield .Their movement was intended to overrun Missouri , and, supported by afriendly population of over a million, to seize upon St. Louis and make thatcity a center of operations for the invasion of the loyal States.

To meet this advancing force I had 23,000 men of all arms. Of this onlysome 15,000 were available, the remainder being three-months men whoso