IN COMMAND IN MISSOURI.

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term of service was expiring. General John Pope was fully occupied in NorthMissouri with nearly all my disposable force, which was required to hold incheck rebellion in that quarter. For the defense of Cairo B. M. Prentiss had8 regiments, but 6 were three-months men, at the end of their term, unpaid,and unwilling to reenlist. At Springfield General Lyon had about 6000men, unpaid and badly fed, and in need of clothing. In this condition hewas in hourly expectation of being attacked by the enemy, who was advanc-ing in three times his nominal strength.

This was the situation to be met at the outset. The arms and equipmentsfor 23,000 men which I had gathered at New York I now found had beendiverted from my department and sent to Virginia. I had no money andthe Government no credit; but the chief difficulty was the want of arms.There was no want of men. The loyal population of the North -westernStates flocked to the Union standard; the German population with a nobleunanimity.

Having these conditions to face, on the 26th of July I telegraphed my needsto Montgomery Blair , whom I had known intimately. In reply he telegraphed,“I find it impossible to get any attention to Missouri or Western mattersfrom the authorities here. You will have to do the best you can and takeall needful responsibility to defend and protect the people over whom youare specially set.” Two days afterward Secretary Seward telegraphed to askwhat disposition I had made of the arms I had purchased in Europe , askingfor an invoice. I telegraphed him that I needed to use these arms for mydepartment, that I had absolutely no arms, and that the situation of the Statewas critical. On the 30th I sent to the President, as had been arranged, anunofficial letter setting forth the condition of my command. I informed himthat the treasurer of the United States at St. Louis had $300,000 entirelyunappropriated, but had refused my request for $100,000 to be delivered tomy paymaster-general. I said to him that there were three courses open tome : “First, to let the enemy possess himself of some of the strongest pointsin the State and threaten St. Louis , which is insurrectionary; second, to forcea loan from the secession banks here; third, to use the money belonging tothe Government which is in the treasury. . . . This morning I will orderthe treasurer to deliver the money in his possession to General Andrews andwill send a force to the treasury to take the money, and will direct suchpayments as the exigency requires. I will hazard everything for the defenseof the department you have confided to me, and I trust to you for support.”To the propositions of this letter the President gave the tacit approval of notreplying, and I acted upon it.

I had no time to lose. The situation of Lyon at Springfield was critical, andthe small disintegrating garrison at Cairo was hourly exposed to assault byan overpowering force. Among the various points threatened, Cairo was thekey to the success of my operations. The waterways and the district aroundCairo were of first importance. Upon the possession of this district dependedthe descent and control of the Mississippi Valley by the Union armies, orthe inroad by the Confederate forces into the loyal States.