THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.

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the proper man to gather around him and hold together the heterogeneousmilitary forces; but, having no organized State or Government to backhim, he seldom could rise above the effectiveness of a guerrilla chief, doingbusiness on a large scale and almost on his own account. His army wasan ever-changing body, varying from week to week, advancing and retreat-ing, without stability of quarters and security of resources, and thereforenot disciplined in a manner to be desired. Sometimes there were men andno arms for them, or muskets without caps and horses without riders; atother times the army of camp-followers and poorly mounted infantry wasalmost as large as the fighting force of infantry. No wonder then that inspite of the great popularity of the champion of Missouri , McCullochbecame disgusted in meeting the half-starved “State Guards” of Missouri with their “ huckleberry ” cavalry and their great crowd of unarmed, noisycamp-followers.

It was therefore fortunate for the Confederates that on the 10th of Jan-uary, 1862, Major-General Earl Van Dorn was appointed by JeffersonDavis to the command of the Trans-Mississippi Department, and that hetook charge of the combined forces about to confront Curtis. He was agraduate of West Point and had served with honors in the Mexican war aslieutenant of infantry, and was in the United States service as major at theopening of the war. Having joined the Confederacy, he was appointedcolonel, and already in Texas had been of great service to his cause. On the14th of February, 1862,—the very day when the Army of the South-westtook possession of Springfield,— he wrote to Price from his headquartersat Pocahontas, stating in detail his plan for “ attempting St. Louis and car-rying the war into Illinois.” Our appearance in Arkansas suddenly changedthe situation. Van Dorn at once hastened from Jacksonport to Van Buren on the 24th of February, issued a very flourishing proclamation on the 2d ofMarch, and on the 3d the Confederate army was on its way from the BostonMountains to Fayetteville and Elm Springs, at which latter place its advancearrived on the evening of the 5th. On this march Price ’s troops were lead-ing, followed by the division of McCulloch, while General Albert Pike , whohad come from the Indian Territory by way of Evansville with a brigade ofIndians, brought up the rear. The secrecy of the movement was so well keptthat positive news did not reach us until the 5th, when the Confederateswere about a day’s march from my position at McKissick’s farm. It was theintention of Van Dorn to move early on the 6th and “gobble up” my twodivisions before they could prepare for defense or make good their retreat;I had, however, ample time to guard myself against the attempted cap-ture, as I had not only been advised by General Curtis on the 5th, afternightfall, of the advance of the enemy, but also had received positive proofof the movement from Colonel Schaefer at Smith’s Mill, whose outposts hadbeen attacked on the evening of the same day, which fact he immediatelyreported. It was now necessary for us to concentrate to meet the enemy’sadvance, and Colonel Schaefer was then directed to fall back during thenight to Bentonville and await further instructions. The time for the two