)20

THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.

divisions to leave McKissick’s farm and march by Bentonville to SugarCreek was fixed for 2 o’clock a. m. of the 6th, but, before the movementbegan, the commanders of divisions and brigades, with their staff-officers,met at my headquarters at 1 o’clock a. m. of that day, to be informedof the enemy’s movements and to receive verbal instructions respectingthe order of march, and the precautions to be taken during the retreat.At precisely 2 o’clock a. m. of the 6th, General Asboth’s division leftMcKissick’s farm with the whole train, followed by the division of ColonelOsterhaus. They passed through Bentonville from 4 to 8 o’clock a. m., andarrived at the camp behind Sugar Creek at 2 p. m., where the Union armywas to concentrate.

For the purpose of defending the main column on its retreat, and with theintention of finding out whether the enemy was approaching in strong force,and whether he was advancing from Smith’s Mill on the road to Bentonville ,or by Osage Springs, or on both roads at the same time, I remained atBentonville with about 600 men, and a battery of 6 pieces, after all thetroops had left the place. £

During this time Colonel Nemett, who had been sent out with theBenton Hussars to reconnoiter, reported to me that he had met the enemy’scavalry, and that several thousand men, cavalry, and infantry were formingin line of battle about a mile from Bentonville on the open fields south ofthe village. From personal observation I found out that this was correct,and, therefore, had not the least doubt that we had the advance of an armybefore us. This was at precisely 10 o’clock. I state these facts to showhow egregiously Van Dorn was mistaken in supposing that if he had arrivedan hour sooner—Maury says 30 minutes sooner—“he would have cut me offwith my whole force [of 7000 men], and certainly have beaten the enemy[our army at Sugar Creek] the next day.” As it really was, he only foundmy rear-guard of 600 men in his front, because at the hour when his troopsadvanced against Bentonville , the leading division (Asboth’s) of our retreatingcolumn crossed Sugar Creek, 10 miles from Bentonville . Van Dorn officiallysays, “IVe followed him [Sigel], our advance skirmishing with his rear-guard, which was admirably handled, until we gained a point on Sugar Creek,about 7 miles beyond Bentonville , and within 1 or 2 miles of the stronglj rintrenched camp of the enemy.” Van Dorn then ascertained, in a conferencewith McCulloch and McIntosh, that by making a detour of eight miles he couldoutflank our position on Sugar Creek, and reach the Telegraph road in ourrear, which movement he commenced soon after dark, Price ’s division leading.He expected to reach the point in our rear, north of Elkhorn Tavern, beforedaylight, but on account of obstructions placed on the road by ColonelDodge’s Iowa regiment his march was so impeded that Price ’s division didnot gain the Telegraph road until nearly 10 a. m. of the 7th, the first dayof the battle, while McCulloch’s division, and the Indian brigade under Pike,

| Colonel Frederick Schaefer’s 2d Missouri regi- lowed the division of Colonel Osterhaus towardment was also to be retained, to form a part of the Sugar Creek; he was ambuscaded on the way,rear-guard, but by some misunderstanding he fol- and lost thirty-seven men.— F. S.