THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN.

321

had only reached a point opposite Leetown, about five miles distant fromwhere Price struck the Telegraph road. (See map, p. 322.)

During the night of the 6th our army rested quietly in its position behindSugar Creek. General Asboth’s division held the extreme right, on theentrance of the Bentonville road, Colonel Osterhaus’s was on his left, ColonelDavis’s in the center, and Colonel Carr’s, which during the 5th had retreatedfrom Cross Hollows (Camp Halleck) behind Sugar Creek, was posted on theextreme left. Asboth’s division was facing west and south-west; the othertwo divisions were facing toward the south. Curtis expected to be attackedfrom the south, and had made all his preparations accordingly. I was,however, doubtful whether the enemy would knock his head against aposition naturally so strong, and for this reason expected the main attackfrom the direction of Bentonville against Asboth’s division, i. e., against out-right flank and rear. To ascertain, therefore, what was going on during thenight in the direction mentioned, I sent out two of my scouts (Brown andPope) with some cavalry, to proceed as far as possible toward the west andnorth-west, and report any movement of hostile troops immediately. Towardmorning they reported that during the night troops and trains were movingon the back road, around our position toward Cross Timber; that theyhad heard the noise of wagons or artillery, but they had not seen thetroops. I then ordered Lieutenant Schramm, of my staff, to go out withan escort and bring in more information. This was at 5 o’clock in themorning. His report, made a little after 6 o’clock, left no doubt in mymind that the enemy was moving around our position toward the north-east (Springfield road). I now went out myself and saw clearly trains andtroops moving in the direction mentioned. At about the same time whenthe flanking movement of the enemy was discovered on our right, MajorWeston of the 24th Missouri Infantry, who was posted in our rear, at Elk-horn Tavern, was informed by his outposts of the advance of some of theenemy’s cavalry on the roads from Bentonville and Cassville, toward hisposition. Between 6 and 7 in the morning, skirmishing had begun near thetan-yard, on the Cassville road, north of Elkhorn Tavern, so that his reportsand those sent in by myself reached General Curtis during the early morningof the 7th. A meeting of the division commanders was called by him for8 o’clock at Pratt’s store, and after a short consultation he directed ColonelCarr to take position at Elkhorn Tavern, while Colonel Bussey was directed toproceed with the cavalry of the different commands (except the 3d Illinois ), andwith three pieces of Elbert’s battery to move by Leetown against the enemy,supposed to be advancing in that direction. Colonel Osterhaus was alsorequested to accompany Colonel Bussey for the purpose of taking control ofthe movement. As up to that time not even a demonstration had been madeagainst our front on Little Sugar Creek, and there was no doubt in my mindthat the main forces of the enemy were working around our flank, I suggestedthe necessity of supporting our cavalry by at least a brigade of infantry andanother battery of my command, because a repulse of the cavalry mightlead to serious consequences. The proposition was immediately accepted,

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