SHILOH RECEIVED.

499

The official reports and other authority locate the First Division (McCler-nand’s) as follows: The right of the Third Brigade is at the point wherethe western Corinth road crosses the Hamburg and Purdy road, 500 yardsfrom the church, and the left is 200 yards from Hildebrand’s brigade, whichis thus obliquely in its front. The other 2 brigades, on a general line start-ing from the right of the Third, form an obtuse angle with the Third, andare along the ridge nearly parallel with Tillman’s Creek, the extreme rightbeing not far from the bluff overlooking Owl Creek bottom. The FirstBrigade is on the east side of the adjacent field instead of the west side, asthe Sherman map, according to the road, would seem to place it, thoughthat map does not show the field. It remains to be added that 3 of the 5divisions were for that period of the war old and experienced troops.Hurlbut’s Third Brigade belonged to the Army of the Ohio, and had beensent to reenforce Grant before Donelson. Eight other regiments were fur-nished by me for the first movement up the Tennessee , and remained withGrant’s army. Sherman’s division, one of the newest, had been under hiscommand more than a month, and ought to have been in a tolerably efficientstate of discipline. Prentiss’s division, composed largely of raw regiments,had only been organized a few days; yet it was posted in the most exposedand assailable point on the front. The effective force at the date of thebattle, exclusive of Lew Wallace ’s division, which was at or near Crump’sLanding, 6 miles below, is stated by General Sherman at 32,000 men; byGeneral Grant at 33,000. General Wallace left 2 regiments of his divisionand a piece of artillery at Crump’s Landing, and joined the army Sundayevening, with, as he states, not more than 5000 men.

I proceed now, in the light of the official reports and other evidence, toexplain briefly what happened: the object being not so much to criticise themanner of the battle, or give a detailed description of it, as to trace it to itsactual condition at the close of the first day, and outline its progress duringthe second. With this object the question of a surprise has little to do. Istop, therefore, only to remark that each revival of that question has placedthe fact in a more glaring light. The enemy was known to be at hand, butno adequate steps were taken to ascertain in what force or with what design.The call to arms blended with the crash of the assault, and when the wholeforest on the rising ground in front flashed with the gleam of bayonets, thenGeneral Sherman, as he reports, “ became satisfied for the first time that theenemy designed a determined attack.” Yet among the more watchful offi-cers in the front divisions, there was a nervous feeling that their superiorswere not giving due heed to the presence of hostile reconnoitering parties,though they little imagined the magnitude of the danger that impended. OnSaturday General Sherman was notified of these parties. He answered thatthe pickets must be strengthened, and instructed to be vigilant; that he wasembarrassed for the want of cavalry; his cavalry had been ordered away, andthe cavalry he was to have instead had not arrived; as soon as they reportedhe would send them to the front and find out what was there. In one of hisbrigades the regimental commanders held a consultation, at which it was