500

SHILOH REVIEWED.

determined to strengthen the pickets. These are curious revelations to asoldier’s ear.

Prentiss’s vigilance gave the first warning of the actual danger, and in fjictcommenced the contest. On Saturday, disquieted by the frequent appearanceof the enemy’s cavalry, he increased his pickets, though he had no evidenceof the presence of a large force. Early Sunday morning one of these picket-guards, startled no doubt by the hum of forty thousand men half a mile dis-tant, waking up for battle, went forward to ascertain the cause, and sooncame upon the enemy’s pickets, which it promptly attacked. It was then aquarter past 5 o’clock, and all things being ready, the Confederate general,accepting the signal of the pickets, at once gave the order to advance. Pre-viously, however, General Prentiss, still apprehensive, had sent forward Col-onel Moore of the 21st Missouri , with five companies to strengthen thepicket-guard. On the way out Colonel Moore met the guard returning tocamp with a number of its men killed and wounded. Sending the latter onto camp and calling for the remaining companies of his regiment, he pro-ceeded to the front in time to take a good position on the border of a clearedfield and opened fire upon the enemy’s skirmishers, checking them for awhile; but the main body forced him back upon the division with a con-siderable list of wounded, himself among the number. All this occurred infront of Sherman’s camp, not in front of Prentiss’s. This spirited beginning,unexpected on both sides, gave the first alarm to the divisions of Shermanand Prentiss. The latter promptly formed his division at the first newsfrom the front, and moved a quarter of a mile in advance of his camp, wherehe was attacked before Sherman was under arms. He held his position untilthe enemy on his right passed him in attacking Sherman, whose left regi-ment immediately broke into rout. He then retired in some disorder, renew-ing the resistance in his camp but forced back in still greater disorder, untilat 9 o’clock he came upon the line which Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace wereforming half a mile in rear.

Upon the first alarm in his camp, which was simultaneous with the attackupon Sherman, McClernand rapidly got under arms, and endeavored tosupport Sherman’s left with his Third Brigade, only two hundred yards inrear, while he placed his First and Second Brigades in inverted order stillfarther to the rear and left, to oppose the enemy’s columns pouring in uponhis left flank through the opening on Sherman’s left; but his Third Brigadewas forced back with the fugitives from Sherman’s broken line by theadvancing enemy, and endeavored with only partial success to form on theright of McClernand ’s line, which at first was formed with the left a littlesouth, and the center north of the Corinth road. Before the formation wascompleted the line was compelled to retire by the pressure on its front and leftflank, with the loss of 6 pieces of artillery, but it re-formed 300 yards in rear.

Hildebrand’s brigade had now disappeared in complete disorder from thefront, leaving three pieces of artillery in the hands of the enemy. Bucklandformed promptly at the first alarm, and in order to keep the enemy backendeavored by Sherman’s dii*ection to throw a regiment beyond Oak Creek,