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strength. His troops were stationed on wooded heights, generally screenedby heavy undergrowth and approached across boggy ravines or open fields.Each camp was a fortress in itself, and the line of retreat afforded at eachstep some like point to rally on. He did not fortify his camps, it is true; buthe was not there for defense, but for attack. It must be admitted that heundervalued his enemy’s daring and celerity; but he was a young general,exultant in his overwhelming victory at Donelson; and his generals and armyshared his sense of security. He had an army of 58,000 men in camp, nearly50,000 of whom were effectives. Buell was near at hand with 37,000 more,and Mitchel was moving against the railroad at Florence, Alabama , not fardistant, with an additional force of 18,000. In all Grant had 105,000 effectives.Opposed to him were 50,000 Confederate troops, less than 40,000 of whom wereavailable for combat. G-eneral Johnston ’s aggregate was 60,000 men, opposedto about 200,000 Federals in all, but the effective forces were as above. Asthese figures are disputed I invite a rigid examination of the Official Records.\
Such was the position on April 2d, when G-eneral Johnston, learning thatBuell was rapidly approaching, resolved to advance next day and attackGrant before his arrival. His general plan was very simple in outline. Itseems to have been to march out and attack the Federals by columns ofcorps, to make the battle a decisive test, and to crush Grant utterly or loseall in the attempt; this effected, to contend with Buell for the possession ofTennessee, Kentucky , and possibly the North-west.
General Beauregard also, it seems, had a plan, which, however, must havediffered widely from that of General Johnston , as it was evidently tentative inits nature,—“ a reconnoissance in force,” with a retreat on Corinth as one of itsfeatures,— and which admitted the possibility of finishing on Monday a battlewhich had to be won on Sunday or never. This was not in any sense GeneralJohnston ’s plan, and much useless discussion has arisen from a confusion ofthe two. But, as General Johnston intended to fight, and did fight, on hisown plan as long as he lived, the battle may be considered his until Beau-regard’s order of retreat, about 5 o’clock Sunday evening, substituted “ thereconnoissance in force” in place of the decisive test of victory or defeat.
General Beauregard had been on the ground some six weeks, and his pres-tige as an engineer and a victor of Bull Run warranted General Johnston in committing to him the elaboration of the details of the march and order ofbattle. Unfortunately he changed what seems evidently General Johnston ’soriginal purpose of an assault by columns of corps into an array in three paral-lel lines of battle, which produced extreme confusion when the second and thirdlines advanced to support the first and intermingled with it. Johnston ’soriginal plan is summed up in the following dispatch to President Davis:
“Corinth, April 3d, 1862. General Buell in motion thirty thousand strong, rapidly fromColumbia by Clifton to Savannah . Miteliel behind him with ten thousand. Confederate forces—forty thousand — ordered forward to offer battle near Pittsburg. Division from Bethel, main
\ By careful and thorough examination of the greatly overestimates the Union strength. BeforeOfficial Records we have not been able to verify January, 1863 (when a new form was adopted),Colonel Johnston’s estimates of forces. In im- the Union returns did not show the number ofportant particulars the Records are not explicit, effectives separate from the “ present for duty,” aand in places they indicate that Colonel Johnston term that included the non-combatants.— Editors.